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ABSTRACT 
Large commercial satellite constellations, colloquially nicknamed “mega- 
constellations,” are providing improved capabilities for satellite operators and enhanced 
services for terrestrial users. While so, the environment in which these large space 
architectures operate, low Earth orbit, is cluttered with active satellites and littered with 
orbital debris. If not properly managed, commercial satellite mega-constellations could 
worsen the space environment for all space operators as they inherently involve more 
satellites and thus more risk. This thesis examines the United States’ management of 
commercial satellites in three segments: pre-launch, on-orbit, and post-mission. This 
thesis further analyzes the entities, documents, and processes involved in the 
U.S.’s management of commercial satellites and identifies areas of concern raised 
by the looming rise of commercial satellite mega-constellations. Recommended 
improvements to the management framework address these concerns and discuss the (1) 
implementation of “core safety minimums,” (2) establishment of rules for day-to-day 
satellite operations, (3) establishment of a set of core definitions and standards, (4) 
establishment and empowerment of a national entity for space situational awareness 
and space traffic management, (5) incentivization of post-mission disposal, and 
(6) reduction of post-mission orbit lifetime limits for expended satellites in decaying 
satellites.
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Among all of Earth’s orbital regimes, low Earth orbit (LEO), cluttered with active 
satellites and littered with orbital debris, is by far the most congested [1]. As economic 
opportunity demands, however, the commercial space industry continues to launch 
satellites into LEO and, now, at a rapid pace due to the growing use of commercial satellite 
mega constellations. While these large space architectures undoubtedly improve services 
in communications and remote sensing, they raise risk in the LEO environment as they 
involve hundreds to thousands of networked satellites [2]. If left inappropriately managed, 
commercial satellite mega-constellations could worsen the space environment for all space 
operators [3]. Although this concern affects all nations, the international community has 
been largely unable to reach consensus on acceptable space behaviors and activities [4]. 
As one of the world’s leading spacefaring nations and the nation that possesses the largest 
commercial satellite mega-constellation [5], the United States must take the initiative and 
establish a standard for other spacefaring nations to follow.  
To this effort, this thesis addresses how the United States government (USG) could 
improve commercial satellite mega-constellations management to ensure LEO’s 
sustainability and safety while also growing the commercial space industry. Although the 
current management framework does not appropriately address commercial satellite mega-
constellations, this thesis examines the entities, documents, and processes involved in the 
pre-launch, on-orbit, and post-mission management of commercial satellites. In addition, 
this thesis identifies areas of concern raised by commercial satellite mega-constellations 
and offers improvements to the U.S. management framework. As this thesis reveals, the 
main challenge facing the management of commercial satellite mega-constellations is the 
lack of national-level oversight and verbiage specifically for these massive space 
architectures. As commercial satellite mega-constellations inherently involve more 
satellites and satellite operators, the potential for accidents can grow significantly [2] if left 
inappropriately managed. This fact becomes apparent in all three segments of commercial 
satellite management. 
xx 
In the pre-launch management of commercial satellites, entities and processes 
largely focus on launch, communications, remote sensing, and, more recently, orbital 
debris mitigation requirements. However, the rise of commercial satellite mega-
constellations now need pre-launch management entities and processes to incorporate 
minimum safety features for satellites that improve on-orbit safety (i.e., satellite 
maneuverability) and management activities (i.e., satellite trackability). Therefore, the 
USG should employ the Department of Commerce’s Office of Space Commerce (OSC) in 
implementing “core safety minimums” that include propulsive capabilities and passive or 
active means of trackability. 
In the on-orbit management of commercial satellites, there is a significant lack of a 
governing presence for commercial satellites. There remains an absence of rules for the 
day-to-day operations of satellites and a governing set of core definitions and standards for 
on-orbit management activities. Furthermore, there is an absence of dedicated, empowered, 
and authoritative entities for national space situational awareness (SSA) and space traffic 
management (STM). Ushering in a large number of active satellites into LEO, commercial 
satellite mega-constellations now necessitate the on-orbit management architecture to 
evolve and appropriately address the looming increase of satellites, operators, and risk. As 
such, the USG should employ the OSC to establish a basic body of space traffic rules and 
a set of core definitions and standards for on-orbit management activities. In addition, 
Congress must improve the formalization and empowerment of the OSC to enable it to 
effectively act as the nation’s focal point for commercial SSA and STM. 
In the post-mission management of commercial satellites, there is a lack of active 
enforcement for post-mission activities and an adequate post-mission lifetime limit for 
satellites with decaying orbits. With the increasing pace at which commercial satellites 
launch [1] and de-orbit as a result of commercial satellite mega-constellations, the USG 
should consider new alternatives for enforcing post-mission disposal (PMD) and 
preventing collisions caused by decaying objects. Therefore, the USG should designate the 
OSC as the national entity for incentivizing PMD, perhaps through a point system, and 
should reduce the post-mission orbit lifetime limit from 25 years to 1 year. 
xxi 
In all three management segments, the USG/OSC must leverage and collaborate 
with the commercial space industry, especially satellite operators, to effectively improve 
the management of commercial satellite mega-constellations. The commercial space 
industry provides a wealth of knowledge, experience, and insight regarding space 
operations which will be significantly valuable for evaluating the feasibility of proposed 
improvements. Close coordination with the commercial space industry can better ensure 
that improvements are promulgated and implemented efficiently and effectively.  
Lastly, improved management of commercial satellites and mega-constellations 
cannot be exclusive to the United States. Due to the fact that the international community 
remains unable to reach consensus on requirements for space activities [3], it may be more 
effective to provide the international community with a functioning management 
framework that pursues improving sustainable and safe space operations as well as growth 
of its commercial space industry. Such a management framework can likely be enticing for 
many, if not all, spacefaring nations to adopt. Therefore, the USG, as one of the world’s 
leading nations in space, must take the initiative and ensure that improvements to its 
management framework are transferable to other spacefaring nations. This means 
genuinely pursuing sustainable and safe space operations as well as growth of the 
commercial space industry. This also includes avoiding improvements that leverage or 
require excessive costs and technologies that only the United States can satisfy. Afterall, 
space is inherently an international domain where one accident affects all.  
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Among all of Earth’s orbital regimes, low Earth orbit (LEO), generally defined as 
the region in space between ~160 to 2,000 km in altitude [1], is by far the most congested. 
As the closest to Earth and therefore the cheapest to reach, LEO is the most popular orbital 
regime for satellite deployments [2]. Resultingly, decades of the world’s space activities 
have left LEO cluttered with active satellites and littered with orbital debris [3]. Yet, on 
2 May 2021, SpaceX placed another 60 Starlink satellites in LEO, expanding the world’s 
largest commercial constellation with the presence of nearly 1,500 satellites [4], [5]. A 
satellite constellation is a “number of similar satellites, of a similar type and function, 
designed to be in similar, complementary, orbits for a shared purpose, under shared 
control” [6]. While large commercial satellite constellations like SpaceX’s Starlink 
undeniably offer tremendous potential for the satellite industry [7], they inevitably increase 
the probability of “mutual collisions among orbiting objects” [8] due to the inherently high 
number of satellites involved in large constellations. From potentially disrupting space 
traffic management efforts to catalyzing collision cascades [8], the massive influx of 
satellites expected to enter LEO by way of large commercial satellite constellations poses 
a significant threat to the sustainability and safety of space operations.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The challenges currently facing the management of large commercial satellite 
constellations primarily derive from three significant trends in space: (1) the 
commercialization of space, (2) the proliferation of commercial satellite mega-
constellations, and (3) the growth of orbital debris. While these trends do not exclusively 
contribute to the increasing difficulty of managing large commercial satellite 
constellations, they collectively provide foundational knowledge that appropriately frame 
the context for current and future challenges. 
2 
1. Commercialization of Space 
Over the last decade, the space domain has seen a significant transition from “old 
space” to “new space” wherein the realm once solely dominated by powerful governments 
has revolutionized into a widely accessible commercial market [9]. While there are several 
terms that describe this shift (e.g., democratized space or Space 2.0 [10]), these terms 
generally describe the nearly explosive emergence of “a decentralized set of space 
companies” [2] that has revitalized the U.S. space industry through “faster and cheaper 
access to space, distinct from more traditional government-driven activities focused on 
security, political, or scientific activities” [10]. Rapid advances in technology and 
manufacturing capability have enabled more advanced and smaller sized satellites to 
deploy into space at lower costs [9]. As a result, these factors have ushered in a wave of 
new commercial space entities that are now conducting activities historically reserved 
solely for governments that could overcome “high fixed-cost barriers to entry” [2]. Today, 
the commercialization of space is evident both qualitatively and quantitatively where trends 
such as the growth in density and diversity of commercial space entities as well as the 
growth in the space economy have unequivocally signified the commercialization of space. 
Qualitatively, the commercialization of space is observable in the substantial 
presence of non-governmental space entities within today’s space community. Lowered 
barriers to enter the space domain such as reduced costs for space launches [11] and 
increased capabilities in the mass production of smaller, lighter, and cheaper spacecraft [2], 
[9] have ushered in numerous new commercial “participants than was historically possible” 
[10]. Such participants include companies like SpaceX, OneWeb, LeoSat, and Kepler 
Communications, among others. In turn, these commercial space entities have further 
reduced costs and brought new products as well as services to the market [2]. As described 
by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) in an August 2020 report, 
“commercial space companies as well as those that provide services and products to space 
agencies have sped up development cycles and reduced the costs of activities such as rocket 
launches, space situational awareness, on-orbit servicing, and space exploration” [2]. 
Today, numerous commercial space entities offering various services exist: 
(1) “space access” companies that launch people and payloads into space, (2) “remote 
3 
sensing” companies that provide imaging and monitoring of the Earth, (3) “satellite data 
and analytics” companies that provide spacecraft information and analyses [2], and 
(4) “communications” companies that provide digital connectivity around the globe [11]. 
More recently, the commercial space industry has begun to see the entrance of entities that 
provide even more services such as (5) “habitats and space stations” companies that will 
offer “facilities for manufacturing, research, and even tourism” in space and (6) “beyond 
low Earth orbit” companies that intend to conduct a variety of missions from asteroid 
mining to the colonization of the Moon and Mars [2]. Table 1 provides examples of current 
and planned commercial space activities and entities.  




Quantitatively, the commercialization of space is observable in the global space 
economy. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the space economy can be described as “the full range of activities and the use of 
resources that create and provide value and benefits to human beings in the course of 
exploring, understanding, managing, and utilizing space” [12]. Under this description and 
4 
according to the Space Foundation in a July 2020 report, the global space economy in 2019 
was worth an estimated $423.8 billion with commercial revenues accounting for roughly 
79.5% ($336.89 billion) of the total space economy [13]. Between 2009 to 2019, the global 
space economy increased approximately $162.2 billion with commercial growth primarily 
fueling the increase every year in the decade [13]–[23]. While Space Foundation reports 
from 2009 to 2013 only describe the growth of commercial space revenues, reports after 
2013 explicitly show that commercial space revenues have consistently remained above 
76% of the global space economy every year [2], [13]–[23]. Figure 1 depicts the growth of 
the global space economy from 2009 to 2019 as well as the growth in commercial space 
revenues from 2014 to 2019. 
 
 
While growth in the density and diversity of commercial space entities as well as 
the growth in the space economy signify the commercialization of space, the trends also 
suggest that global space activity will only become increasingly dominated by the 
commercial sector. Within this context, the key challenge moving forward will be 
5 
maintaining the long-term sustainability and safety of space operations while enabling the 
continued growth of the commercial space industry. 
2. Proliferation of Commercial Satellite Mega-constellations 
Satellite constellations are not a new space trend and have been in use for quite 
some time. Take, for instance, the Global Positioning System (GPS) which became 
operational in 1993 [24]. The history of GPS can be traced back to the 1950s and 1960s 
where the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) launched several “Transit” and “Timation” 
satellites [25] to track its submarines carrying nuclear missiles [24]. Today, satellite 
constellations in LEO and in geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) provide a variety of space-
based capabilities such as communications, navigation, remote sensing, and scientific 
research. Large commercial satellite constellations, on the other hand, are the most recent 
trend in space, particularly in LEO, and are becoming more widely desired by commercial 
actors [2]. Colloquially nicknamed satellite “mega-constellations” [26], large commercial 
satellite constellations are described as “radically new space architectures” as they can 
consist of hundreds or even thousands of satellites [11].  
While the increase in its popularity primarily stems from several commercial 
interests like communications and remote sensing [27], the most prominent driver is 
providing global internet access. In 2019, the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) reported that while 86.6% of individuals in developed countries use the internet, the 
number drops to 47% in developing countries and drops even further to 19.1% in the least 
developed countries [28]. Even within the United States, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) reported in their most recent Broadband Progress Report that 10% of 
all Americans (34 million), 39% of rural Americans (23.4 million), and 4% of urban 
Americans lack access to the FCC’s threshold for internet access [29]. As such, satellite-
provided internet, via mega-constellations, “aims to close the gap by reaching these remote 
areas, where ground-based infrastructure is either nonexistent or insufficient to provide 
broadband speeds” [30].  
However, to accomplish this task, hundreds to thousands of LEO satellites are 
required to achieve global and redundant coverage [30]. Coincidentally, the same factors 
6 
that enabled the commercialization of space have also enabled the proliferation of 
commercial satellite mega-constellations. As described in a 2018 report by Swiss Re, the 
world’s second largest reinsurance company and, at the time, an insurer of satellites and 
launches [31], “advances in technology and spacecraft manufacturing have enabled the 
proliferation of smaller and less expensive but fully capable satellites” [9]. As a result, 
commercial space entities are now pursuing [9] these “proliferated constellations made up 
of dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of satellites in low orbits” [11] to provide “almost 
fiber-optic internet speeds” [30]. 
For example, SpaceX has not only developed lower costing launch vehicles, but 
has also deployed its Starlink constellation to provide broadband internet services from 
LEO [2]. Competitors like Amazon and OneWeb have shown similar ambitions and have 
together already applied for the operation of thousands of satellites [30]. According to 
NAPA, “by 2025, as many as 1,100 satellites could be launched per year, quickly eclipsing 
the approximately 2,800 active satellites that are currently in orbit” [2]. With the satellite 
internet market alone projected to reach $412 billion by 2040 [32], the number of satellite 
mega-constellations to soon exist in LEO is concerning. Within this context, the key 
challenge will be effectively and safely managing thousands of active satellites in a 
congested low-Earth environment. 
3. Growth of Orbital Debris in LEO 
As stated in NAPA’s August 2020 report, “by all accounts, there is a crisis in space” 
[2]. In the last half a century of man’s space exploration and exploitation activities, the 
number of space debris in Earth orbit has increased significantly. According to the Inter-
Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, space debris, also known as orbital debris, 
is defined as “all manmade objects including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit 
or re-entering the atmosphere, that are nonfunctional” [33]. Orbital debris consists of 
objects like spent rocket bodies, non-operational spacecraft, mission-related objects (rings, 
bolts, etc.), and fragments generated by collisions or explosions [8], [34]. As of May 2020, 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) estimates that there are over 
100.5 million pieces of orbital debris in LEO [35]. Figure 2 depicts the growth of 
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catalogued objects in Earth orbit from 1956 to 2020 with roughly two-thirds of the objects 
orbiting in LEO [30]. 
 
 
While several sources of orbital debris exist, the largest and quickest contributors 
are intentional breakups and collisions [30]. Intentional breakups are typically associated 
with anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon tests such as China’s ASAT test on a non-operational 
Chinese weather satellite, the Fengyun-1C (FY-1C), in January 2007 [36]. Sparking 
international uproar for its contribution of orbital debris in LEO [30], China’s destruction 
of its FY-1C generated a cloud of more than 3,000 pieces of orbital debris which was not 
only the largest ever tracked [36], but also amounted to one-sixth of all radar-trackable 
debris [30]. Much of the debris cloud generated by China’s ASAT test will remain in orbit 
for decades and thus poses a significant threat to all current and future spacecraft operating 
in LEO [36]. Figure 3 provides an illustration of the debris cloud generated by China’s 
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2007 ASAT test. According to NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office in July 2018, 
“breakup debris have surpassed half of the cataloged Earth satellite population” [37]. 
 
 
Collisions, on the other hand, are typically unintentional and can occur between 
two satellites, between two pieces of orbital debris, or between a satellite and a piece of 
orbital debris. For example, the first collision between two satellites occurred in February 
2009 where an active U.S. satellite, Iridium 33, collided with an inactive Russian satellite, 
Cosmos 2251 [38]. The collision generated nearly 2,000 pieces of orbital debris sized at 
least 10 cm in diameter with thousands more smaller pieces [38]. Like China’s 2007 ASAT 
test, the debris cloud generated by the Iridium-Cosmos collision will remain in orbit for 
decades or longer and poses a significant threat to all current and future spacecraft 
operating in LEO [38]. Figure 4 provides an illustration of the Iridium-Cosmos collision 
and the resulting debris cloud. Furthermore, a 2019 study for the first International Orbital 
Debris Conference (IOC) reported that research now suggests the “number density of 
debris in some LEO altitude regimes have already passed a tipping point where the rate at 
which new debris added by collisions exceeds the rate at which debris decays” [39]. 
Though rare, events like intentional breakups and collisions have directly and largely 




Today, LEO is “the most debris-filled region” [7] where the number of orbital 
debris, roughly 100.5 million [35], greatly eclipses the number of active satellites, 
approximately 1,900 as of September 2020 [7]. The growth of orbital debris, regardless of 
whether generated by intentional breakups, collisions, explosions, or lack of post-mission 
disposal, has accumulated to the point where, even with no new launches, collisions among 
existing objects in LEO will occur over the next 200 years [8]. Within this context, the key 
challenge will be preventing the generation of new and more orbital debris which already 
threatens current space safety. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Compounding the risks associated with satellite and orbital debris congestion in 
LEO is the growing utilization of commercial satellite mega-constellations. Although these 
large space architectures undoubtedly provide enhanced capabilities and services, the sheer 
number of satellites involved with these architectures poses a significant risk in the low 
Earth space operating environment. If left inappropriately managed, commercial satellite 
mega-constellations could become a significant source of debris themselves [9]. As the 
surge of commercial satellites in LEO continues, the management of commercial satellites, 
which currently do not address large constellations appropriately, must improve to ensure 
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the long-term sustainability and safety of space operations while also enabling growth of 
the space industry. 
As such, this thesis aims to address how to improve the management of 
commercial satellite mega-constellations to ensure the sustainability and safety of 
LEO as well as enable growth of the commercial space industry. Although 
“management” is a relatively broad term, this thesis divides the concept into three areas for 
examination: pre-launch, on-orbit, and post-mission. Furthermore, due to the significant 
lack of documents, verbiage, and rules that specifically apply to commercial satellite mega-
constellations, this thesis examines the “management” of these large space architectures 
through the management of commercial satellites in general. Each of the following three 
chapters, in respect to its segment of management, describes significant entities and their 
roles, pertinent documents and their functions, and areas of concern raised by commercial 
satellite mega-constellations. The fifth chapter addresses these concerns and offers 
recommendations for improving the management framework of commercial satellite 
mega-constellations. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While examination of the U.S. management of commercial satellites and mega-
constellations will come in the following chapters, it is critical and necessary to first 
examine the means of space governance in which future improvements should derive. For 
instance, space governance can take form as a single entity (where improvements leverage 
authoritative power) or several entities (where improvements leverage communal 
responsibility), and can be exercised through soft (guidelines, standards, best practices) or 
hard governance (laws and regulations). These factors can ultimately indicate whether 
improvements to the U.S. management framework for commercial satellites and mega-
constellations are feasible or even necessary. While so, space is inherently an international 
domain. Thus, it would be naïve to assume that any improvements made to U.S. 
management framework will transcend into the international domain if not appropriately 
framed and enabled to do so. As such, rather than focusing on an approach specifically 
tailored to the United States, the following section explores an approach tailored to the 
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international community which can then be initiated by the United States at the national 
level. 
First, it is important to examine the overarching international space governance 
framework upon which national space governances derive and reference. In Crowded 
Orbits: Conflicts and Cooperation in Space, Dr. Clay Moltz analyzes three potential 
international space governance frameworks: (1) “military hegemony based on relative 
power,” (2) “piecemeal global engagement based on consensual norms,” and (3) “enhanced 
international institutions based on new treaties and legal mechanisms” [40]. Within the first 
framework, a space hegemony establishes dominance within the space domain and thereby 
exercises space governance through the employment of military force to “maintain 
effective control of space in a way that is perceived as tough, nonarbitrary, and efficient” 
[40]. However, this framework is not only unrealistic, but is also, as Moltz argues, 
“unlikely to lead to beneficial and sustainable outcomes” [40]. 
Within the second framework, the international community exercises space 
governance by pressuring space actors to conform to consensual norms [40]. As Moltz 
describes, the second framework is much like today’s form of space governance that 
muddles through “limited, piecemeal treaties and ad hoc problem solving” which, as Moltz 
claims, “has arguably worked so far and could conceivably be extended into the future” 
[40]. However, this framework, which is the current means of space governance, 
progressively proves to be inadequate. For more than a decade, international discussions 
regarding space security have ranged from proposals for new international space 
organizations and treaties to codes of conduct and “purely voluntary means of self-
restraint” [40]. Ultimately, there is significant difficulty for spacefaring nations to reach 
consensus especially “in a field where there is a great deal of dual-use technology, enduring 
military distrust among leading actors, and questions about the viability of future 
agreements in terms of compliance and verification” [40]. As such, today’s means of space 
governance, an international forum of sorts, is insufficient at addressing growing space 
activities and lacks the formal mechanisms required to enforce established rules. 
In Moltz’s third and final framework, enhanced and international institutions that 
possess technical competence and a commitment to “optimize current and planned space 
12 
activities with the goal of sustaining the environment” exercise space governance [40]. 
Within this framework, international entities that represent “all nations conducting space 
activities” exercise space governance through formal negotiations, legally binding 
agreements, and political influence [40]. As Moltz proposes, such a regime would look 
similar to the governance structure of the International Space Station (ISS) which “is not 
an ad hoc norm-based mechanism, but instead a formal organization based on 
intergovernmental agreements that specify a complex formula of contributions and access 
for each country” [40]. The success of the ISS, which stems from “the clarity of its rules 
and the fact that it is a limited self-interested body not dependent on the United Nations or 
large numbers of non-spacefaring nations” [40], offers a framework which seemingly 
possesses the best chance of transcending to international space governance for commercial 
satellite mega-constellations. 
However, progress in international space governance has been particularly slow 
since the mid-1970s [40], and thus a proposal of such an enhanced international institution 
seems like a tremendous leap forward from today’s means of space governance. While an 
end-state to space governance may be relatively clear, the starting point for efforts to 
concentrate is less clear. Nevertheless, some direction can be drawn from commonly shared 
opinions within the commercial space industry. In Space Governance in the New Space 
Era, Daniel L. Oltrogge and Ian A. Christensen state that the space industry is “generally 
not keen to be regulated because regulations can impose inconveniences, constraints, 
delays and costs” [41]. This is more applicable for experienced satellite operators who, 
after decades of involvement in satellite activities, are cognizant of “what works best for 
their operations” and “have developed long-standing procedures, best practices and norms 
of behavior” [41]. For these reasons, the authors state that “non-binding voluntary industry 
best practices and self-governance tend to be favored by space operators and [the] 
commercial industry” [41]. To this end, perhaps the establishment of a new international 
entity that prescribes “non-binding voluntary industry best practices” [41] may be an 
acceptable place to begin concentrating efforts. 
In A Practical Perspective on Space Traffic Management, Dr. Darren McKnight 
proposes the establishment of a “public-private partnership” called the Space Operations 
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Assurance Consortium (SOAC) [42]. Although specifically focused on space traffic 
management, the SOAC is an example of an enhanced international institution, described 
by Moltz, that could conceivably prescribe “non-binding voluntary industry best practices” 
[41], described by Oltrogge and Christensen. As explained by McKnight, the SOAC would 
ultimately “facilitate deliberate interactions between stakeholders” regarding Space 
Operations Assurance (SOA) activities [42]. McKnight states that the SOAC would not 
only help develop and define the three components (i.e., space situational awareness, space 
traffic management, and space environment management) of the SOA framework, but 
would also “help manage interactions and results from and across these three domains” 
[42] which can notionally include prescription of “non-binding voluntary industry best 
practices” [41]. 
However, any concept involving an international entity prescribing standards, best 
practices, or norms, regardless of whether they are binding or non-binding, is subject to 
one significant challenge which is buy-in. As discussed by Moltz, spacefaring nations have 
historically proved to be ineffective at reaching consensus for space activities [40]. 
Achieving buy-ins for voluntary standards, best practices, or norms from spacefaring 
nations is no different of a case. In the example of McKnight’s SOAC, however, McKnight 
suggests that the SOAC “be established at a national level and then combined into bilateral 
and multilateral implementations before trying to execute globally” [42]. If applied to the 
management of commercial satellite mega-constellations, this approach could offer great 
potential. However, such a national level entity must first be effective before being 
combined into “bilateral and multilateral implementations” [42]. What remains unclear is 
whether or not the designated national-level entity requests or mandates compliance to 
standards, best practices, and norms. 
Regardless of how the SOAC-like national entity comes about, the designated 
entity must consider the appropriate approach to managing its satellites, including 
commercial satellite mega-constellations, at the national level. Two basic types of space 
governance can be employed: binding and non-binding space governance [41]. Binding 
space governance, considered “hard” governance, utilizes legally binding agreements or 
normative instruments like national standards and regulations [41]. Non-binding space 
14 
governance, considered “soft” governance, utilizes voluntary or non-normative agreements 
[41]. Although space entities seem to prefer non-binding or soft space governance, binding 
or hard space governance provides legal or regulative authority to management entities for 
enforcing rules and mitigating undesired or dangerous activities in space. To effectively 
manage commercial satellite mega-constellations, the consideration of whether to employ 
soft or hard space governance is critical in ensuring that efforts are appropriate and not 
potential backsteps. 
As discussed in the work of Oltrogge and Christensen, the space industry is 
generally in favor of less regulation [41]. As such, Dr. Michael P. Gleason in Establishing 
Space Traffic Management Standards, Guidelines and Best Practices strongly emphasizes 
the application soft law in space governance [43]. While Gleason notes the need and lack 
of hard space regulations, he suggests that the first step in “protecting the space 
environment is for commercial actors, in collaboration with government and international 
stakeholders, to develop internationally accepted, voluntary standards, guidelines, and best 
practices” [43]. Similarly, in A Path Forward to Better Space Security: Finding New 
Solutions to Space Debris, Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management, 
Dr. Joseph N. Pelton suggests that nations consider adopting a series of soft law initiatives 
to deal with current space security issues [44]. Pelton’s suggestion offers great potential 
due to the better likelihood of space entities galvanizing industry-wide cooperation and 
support to address pertinent space security issues. 
Although it is now seemingly apparent that soft space governance is the preferred 
way forward, it is by no means the final solution. The presented works above merely 
highlight the first appropriate step in bringing space entities together via soft space 
governance. Finer details that comprise governance such as entities, documents, and 
processes now require examination to determine if soft governance is practically 
appropriate for addressing concerns raised by commercial satellite mega-constellations. 
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II. PRE-LAUNCH MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The pre-launch management of commercial satellites ensures the proper 
preparation and safety of satellites for launch and operations once on-orbit. Activities 
include reviewing and assessing satellite compliance with both national and international 
requirements as well as approving satellite launch and on-orbit activities. At the 
international level, numerous entities and documents provide guidance for pre-launch 
management activities. However, the list narrows when only considering those that 
mandate compliance from U.S. commercial satellites. The United Nation’s (UN) 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the ITU’s 
Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R) are the only international entities that mandate 
compliance. The UN’s “Outer Space Treaty” (OST) and “Registration Convention” (REG) 
as well as the ITU’s Radio Regulations (RR) are the only international documents that 
mandate compliance. The rules established by these international management 
mechanisms are implemented at the U.S. national level by three federal entities—the Office 
of Space Transportation (AST), the Satellite Division, and the Commercial Remote 
Sensing Regulatory Affairs Office (CRSRA). All three federal entities possess regulatory 
authority [3] and thus apply and regulations and policies to U.S. commercial satellites in 
addition to implementing requirements established by international treaties, agreements, 
and principles. Generally satisfying the international obligations of the United States [45], 
current U.S. pre-launch management processes focus on three areas of satellite operations: 
launch, communications, and remote sensing. This chapter identifies and describes key 
entities, pertinent documents, current processes, and significant areas of concern within the 
U.S. pre-launch management architecture. 
B. SIGNIFICANT ENTITIES 
At the international level, several entities are involved in the pre-launch 
management of U.S. commercial satellite mega-constellations to varying degrees. Among 
these entities, only COPUOS and the ITU-R possess the authority to prescribe national-
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level requirements and thereby mandate compliance from U.S. commercial satellites. 
Although COPUOS and the ITU-R primarily operate through binding requirements, two 
other international entities contribute to the pre-launch management of U.S. commercial 
satellite mega-constellations through non-binding guidelines and best practices—the Inter-
Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) and the Space Safety Coalition 
(SSC). At the national level within the United States, the AST, Satellite Division, and the 
CRSRA collectively conduct the pre-launch management of commercial satellites in which 
they oversee, regulate, and facilitate activities and requirements for their respective areas 
of expertise. 
1. International Entities 
• COPUOS, established in 1959, is a permanent committee within the UN 
that governs the global “exploration and use of space for the benefit of all 
humanity” [46]. COPUOS reviews international cooperation in space 
activities, studies space-related legal issues [46], and facilitates forum-like 
discussions for governments to address matters pertaining to international 
space governance [2]. Although COPUOS does not actively manage 
satellite activities, the discussions and resulting resolutions of COPUOS 
have established a broad international framework that outlines appropriate 
behaviors and activities in space. As such, COPUOS establishes the 
requirement for spacefaring nations, those opting to comply, to be 
responsible for supervising and approving all respective governmental and 
non-governmental space activities [47]. Additionally, COPUOS 
establishes the requirement for those spacefaring nations to maintain a 
registry of all objects launched into space as well as submitting objects to 
the UN Secretary General [48]. As of 2019, COPUOS has 95 member 
states [49]. 
• The ITU-R, established in 1927 as the International Radio Consultative 
Committee then renamed in 1992 [50], is a sector of the ITU that ensures 
the “rational, equitable, efficient and economical use of the radio-
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frequency spectrum by all radiocommunication services” including those 
that utilize satellite orbits [51]. The ITU-R maintains the Master 
International Frequency Register (MIFR) which “records the international 
rights and obligations of satellites and associated Earth stations” to utilize 
the radio frequency (RF) spectrum [52]. Additionally, the ITU-R 
maintains the RR and implements the rules and intents therein to ensure 
“interference free operations of radiocommunications systems” [53]. In 
regard to the pre-launch management segment, the ITU-R manages, 
allocates, and assigns portions of the RF spectrum for satellites [54]. 
• The IADC, established in 1993 [55], is an “international governmental 
forum for the worldwide coordination of activities related to the issues of 
man-made and natural debris in space” [56]. As an international 
consortium of national space agencies [2], the IADC facilitates 
information exchange and fosters international cooperation in orbital 
debris research, space activities, and the development of debris mitigation 
responses and techniques [2], [56]. In addition, the IADC is a critical 
informer of space debris mitigation for the international community [57]. 
Although the IADC does not prescribe international nor national 
requirements for the pre-launch management segment, it maintains and 
offers a voluntary collection of advisable satellite design considerations 
and operational concepts known as the IADC Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines. As of April 2021, the IADC has 13 national space agencies 
[56]. 
• The SSC, recently established in 2019, is an “ad hoc coalition of 
companies, organizations, and other government and industry stakeholders 
that actively promotes responsible space safety” [58]. The SSC adopts and 
improves on “international standards, guidelines, and practices” relevant 
to space safety [58]. Like the IADC, the SSC does not prescribe 
international nor national requirements for the pre-launch management of 
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commercial satellites. However, the SSC maintains and offers a voluntary 
collection of advisable satellite design considerations and operational 
concepts known as the Best Practices for the Sustainability of Space 
Operations. As of April 2021, the SSC has 48 commercial endorsees [59] 
and currently leads in the development of best practices that sustain the 
space operating environment [2]. 
2. U.S. National Entities 
• The AST, established in 1984, is an office within the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) at the Department of Transportation (DOT) that 
regulates “the U.S. commercial space transportation industry to ensure 
compliance with international obligations of the United States” [60]. 
Delegated to execute the DOT’s responsibility of managing and 
facilitating U.S. commercial launch operations [61], the AST permits and 
licenses launches, spaceports, and transportation vehicles [2], [62]. As the 
“FAA’s only space-related line of business” [60], the AST implements the 
rules and intents established in Chapter III within Title 14 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (14 CFR) on commercial satellites along with any 
international requirements. 
• The Satellite Division is an office within the International Bureau at the 
FCC that licenses the use of the RF spectrum by commercial U.S. 
satellites [62]. Delegated to execute the FCC’s responsibility for 
regulating the domestic and non-federal use of the RF spectrum by 
satellites [57], [62], the Satellite Division implements the rules and intents 
established in Chapter I within Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 
47 (47 CFR) to regulate commercial satellite communications [62], [63] 
and to foster the “efficient use of the radio frequency spectrum” [63]. 
• The CRSRA is an office within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) at the Department of Commerce (DOC) that 
licenses U.S. commercial space-based remote sensing systems and 
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operations [64]. Delegated to execute the DOC’s responsibility of 
licensing “private sector parties to operate private remote sensing space 
systems” [65], the CRSRA implements the rules and intents established in 
Chapter IX within 15 CFR and addresses remote sensing concerns 
regarding national security, foreign policy, and international compliance 
[62]. 
• The Office of Space Affairs is an element within the Bureau of Oceans 
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES/SA) at the 
Department of State (DOS) [66] that primarily “handles international 
space issues and represents the United States in [COPUOS]” [2]. Although 
most of the Office’s activities pertain to outward-facing civil and 
international space matters [2], it maintains the “official U.S. registry of 
objects launched into outer space” [66], an OST requirement established 
within the OST. 
C. PERTINENT DOCUMENTS 
At the international level, numerous documents are involved in the pre-launch 
management of U.S. commercial satellite mega-constellations. Among these documents, 
the OST, REG, and RR are binding for U.S. commercial satellites. In addition, few non-
binding documents contribute to the pre-launch management of U.S. commercial satellite 
mega-constellations—COPUOS’ Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines (LTS Guidelines), 
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of COPUOS, the IADC Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines, and the SSC’s Best Practices for the Sustainability of Space Operations. In the 
United States, numerous national documents support the pre-launch management of 
commercial satellites by sanctioning regulatory authority for federal entities, outlining 
regulative requirements, and advising satellite conditions and concepts.  
1. International Treaties, Agreements, and Principles 
• The OST, officially known as the Treaty of Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including 
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the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, is a treaty maintained by COPUOS 
that “provides the basic framework on international space law” [47]. 
Effective since October 1967 [47], the OST outlines broad principles for 
appropriate behaviors and activities in space to promote international 
cooperation on peaceful space activities. The OST is binding for nations 
that have ratified the agreement and is therefore binding for U.S. 
commercial satellites [67], [68]. Although numerous articles exist within 
the OST, pertinent to the pre-launch management of commercial satellites 
is Article VI in which the COPUOS establishes signatories as responsible 
for the authorization and supervision of all respective governmental and 
non-governmental space activities [69]. As of January 1st, 2020, 110 
countries have ratified the treaty [68]. 
• The REG, officially known as the Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, is also a treaty maintained by COPUOS and 
provides a framework in which there is “a means to assist in the 
identification of space objects” [70]. Effective since September 1976 [70], 
the REG empowers the UN Secretary General to “maintain a registry of 
objects launched into space” [2] and to “ensure full and open access to the 
information” [70] for all interested parties. Like the OST, the REG is 
binding for nations that have ratified the agreement and is therefore 
binding for U.S. commercial satellites [67]. Within the document Article 
II mandates signatories to maintain a registry of all objects launched into 
space in addition to submitting objects to the UN Secretary General [48]. 
As of January 1st, 2020, 69 countries have ratified the agreement [68]. 
• The LTS Guidelines, officially known as the Guidelines for the Long-
Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [71], is a “set of 21 voluntary consensus 
Guidelines” that promote and ensure the long-term sustainability of space 
activities [72]. Effective since June 2019 [71], the LTS Guidelines is 
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“intended to support the development of national and international 
practices and safety frameworks for conducting outer space activities” as 
well as the mitigation of associated risks [72]. While the document 
provides advisable practices in all three segments of satellite management, 
pertinent to the pre-launch segment is Guideline A in which COPUOS 
provides best practices for the supervision of national space activities and 
enhancement of registering space objects, among others [72]. 
• The RR is an ITU-generated rulebook that “contains the complete texts of 
the Radio Regulations adopted by the World Radiocommunication 
Conference of 1995” [73]. The RR is “binding under a 1992 treaty, the 
Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunications 
Union” [62] and is therefore binding for U.S. commercial satellites. The 
RR supports the ITU-R in facilitating “the efficient and effective operation 
of all radiocommunication services” [74] including satellite 
communications. 
• The IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines describes “existing 
practices that have been identified and evaluated for limiting the 
generation of space debris in the environment” [33]. As the first set of 
“documents in the international sphere [that] accumulated the space debris 
mitigation practices of space agencies” [75], the IADC Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines offers a voluntary collection of mitigation measures 
that limit orbital debris in all three segments of satellite management. 
Specific to the pre-launch management segment, however, Mitigation 
Measures 5.1 and 5.2 provide satellite design considerations and 
operational concepts that mitigate orbital debris. 
• The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of COPUOS is based on the 
elements of the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines  [75]. Effective 
since December 2007, the document, like the source it is based on, 
provides broad guidelines that mitigate orbital debris in the “mission 
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planning, design, manufacture and operational (launch, mission, and 
disposal) phases” of satellites [76]. Pertinent to the pre-launch 
management of commercial satellites are Guidelines 1 to 3 in which 
COPUOS provides satellite design considerations and operational 
concepts that mitigate the generation of orbital debris. 
• The Best Practices for the Sustainability of Space Operations is an 
SSC-generated document that addresses “gaps in current space governance 
and [promotes] better spacecraft design, operations and disposal practices 
aligned with long term space operations sustainability” [58]. Released in 
September 2019 [77], the Best Practices for the Sustainability of Space 
Operations was developed and is updated collectively by numerous 
commercial space companies to provide consensus-based standard 
practices for responsible and safe space activities in all phases of satellite 
operations [58]. Unlike most of the previously discussed international 
documents, the SSC-generated document provides more detailed and 
study-based design considerations and operational concepts for both 
satellites and constellations. Relevant to the pre-launch management of 
commercial satellites, Best Practices 3 to 4 provide guidance for safer 
satellite and constellation designs.  
2. National Laws, Regulations, and Policy Directives 
• The United States Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard 
Practices (USGODMSP), is a national-level guideline that provides key 
objectives and core standard practices for limiting and minimizing orbital 
debris resulting from space activities. Initially developed in 2001 [78], 
[79], the USGODMSP “establishes a framework for debris mitigation 
requirements” and mandates compliance from USG agencies and 
organizations while allowing those entities to “impose more specific or 
more stringent rules” [80]. The USGODMSP provides a collection of 
advisable designs and operational concepts for satellites and constellations 
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which are implemented through the licensing processes of the AST, 
Satellite Division, and CRSRA [62]. 
• The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, effective since October 
1984, is a “federal law authored to facilitate the private enterprise of the 
commercialization of space and space technology” [81]. In recognition of 
the private sector as a legitimate and viable option for outsourcing 
government launching facilities and services [81], the Act stands as the 
“legal basis for commercial space launch policy” [82]. Furthermore, the 
Act tasks the DOT to oversee and coordinate commercial launches as well 
as the issuing of licenses and permits for commercial launches and 
reentries [81]. 
• Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), Chapter III 
contains the FAA’s regulations on commercial space transportation 
activities that satisfies compliance and authorization mandates outlined in 
the OST and Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984. Titled Commercial 
Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Department of 
Transportation [83], Chapter III of 14 CFR promulgates the requirement 
for commercial space companies to obtain a license for launch and reentry 
operations from the FAA. 
• The Communications Act of 1934, built upon the Radio Act of 1927, 
established the FCC to stabilize and regulate both interstate and foreign 
communications by radio, television, and wire during a period in which 
the radio industry was rapidly growing [84]. Later amended to include the 
regulation of satellite telecommunications [2], the Communications Act of 
1934 currently remains as the FCC’s source of broad regulatory authority 
to license the RF use of commercial satellite communications and to 
implement requirements established by the ITU-R [62]. 
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• 47 CFR, Chapter I, titled Federal Communications Commission [85], 
contains the FCC’s regulations on all telecommunications activities and 
satisfies authorization and oversight mandates outlined by the ITU Radio 
Regulations. Chapter I of 47 CFR promulgates the requirement for 
commercial space companies to obtain a license for their satellites to 
utilize the RF spectrum. 
• Although the Land Remote-Sensing Policy Act of 1992 repealed the 
Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 [65], both acts 
were critical in empowering the DOC to “license and regulate the private 
remote-sensing industry” [2]. The Land Remote-Sensing Policy Act of 
1992 currently remains as the CRSRA’s source of regulatory authority to 
license commercial remote sensing space systems. 
• 15 CFR, Chapter IX, Part 960, titled Licensing of Private Remote 
Sensing Space Systems [86], contains NOAA’s regulations on commercial 
remote sensing activities that satisfies authorization and oversight 
mandates outlined in The Remote Sensing Principles and the Land 
Remote-Sensing Policy Act of 1992. 15 CFR Chapter IX Part 960 
promulgates the requirement for commercial space companies to obtain a 
license for space-based remote sensing operations from NOAA. 
• Space Policy Directive – 2, Streamlining Regulations on Commercial 
Use of Space (SPD-2), issued in May 2018, calls on federal space entities 
involved in the pre-launch management of commercial satellites (i.e., 
DOT, DOC, FCC), among others, to “review existing regulations and 
ensure rules are not duplicative while also promoting economic growth, 
advancing national security and foreign policy goals” [87]. As a result of 
the considerations and intents presented in the directive, several federal 
entities involved with commercial space activities have updated their 
policies and rules. Examples include the FAA/DOT amending 14 CFR to 
“consolidate multiple regulatory parts to create a single licensing regime 
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for all types of commercial space flight launch and reentry operations” 
[88], the FCC amending 47 CFR to “streamline the licensing process for 
small satellites” [57], and NOAA/DOC amending 15 CFR to “streamline 
the licensing process for U.S. satellite remote sensing operators” [89]. 
D. KEY PROCESSES 
Before U.S. commercial satellites launch and integrate with their mega-
constellations in LEO, licensing procedures and regulative requirements properly prepare 
the satellites for launch and operations once on-orbit. Current U.S. pre-launch management 
processes include reviewing and assessing satellite compliance with both national and 
international requirements as well as authorizing satellite launch and on-orbit activities. 
Although U.S. pre-launch management processes have primarily focused on regulating and 
authorizing satellite launch, communications, and remote sensing activities, they now also 
focus on orbital debris mitigation. 
1. Radio Frequency License Requirement 
All satellites require use of the RF spectrum to communicate with either terrestrial 
stations or another spacecraft. The RF spectrum, however, is finite and thus requires 
coordination and synchronization in its usage to prevent or mitigate interference [2]. As a 
result, commercial space companies that intend to operate satellites that utilize RF must 
obtain a license from the FCC to use a portion of the RF spectrum, as mandated by the 
Communications Act of 1934 [62]. Alongside licensing RF use for satellites, the FCC also 
implements international requirements established by the ITU’s RR [62]. Currently, the 
Satellite Division within the FCC’s International Bureau licenses the majority of U.S. 
commercial satellites under the regulatory procedures outlined in Part 25, Satellite 
Communication, of 47 CFR [62]. Through the FCC, the United States applies the ITU’s 
Radio Regulations, which are binding under a 1992 treaty known as the Constitution and 
Convention of the ITU [62], to all commercial satellites that utilize the RF spectrum [2]. 
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2. Remote Sensing License Requirement 
Mandated by the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, commercial space 
companies that intend to operate remote sensing satellites must obtain a license from the 
CRSRA to do so [65]. In the process of issuing licenses, the CRSRA is “required by law 
to consult with ‘other appropriate United States Government agencies’ to ensure that any 
national security or foreign policy concerns are addressed and to ensure compliance with 
international obligations” [62]. According to an April 2017 memorandum of 
understanding, the principal entities that must be consulted are the DOC, DOS, DOD, and 
Department of the Interior (DOI) [90]. Currently, the CRSRA licenses remote sensing 
missions for individual satellites or for entire satellite constellations [62]. 
3. Launch License Requirement 
As mandated by the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, any entity intending 
to launch and/or operate a launch vehicle or site within the United States must obtain a 
license to do so [91]. As a result, commercial space companies planning to launch a satellite 
into orbit must obtain a license from the FAA’s AST for the operation of commercial 
launch vehicles [62]. Currently, the AST provides two types of licenses: specific and 
operator licenses. The specific license “authorizes one or more individually identified 
launches, all at the same site and using the same type of vehicle” [62]. The operator license 
“authorizes an unspecified number of launches, using a family of similar but not 
necessarily identical vehicles, over a period of years” [62]. In addition, spaceports, which 
are commercial launch and reentry sites, must be licensed to conduct activities [62]. As of 
January 2021, 12 spaceports have active spaceport operator licenses [62]. 
4. Third-Party Liability Insurance Requirement 
Once a launch license is issued, the AST further requires launch providers to obtain 
liability insurance as required by Chapter III of 14 CFR [83]. The required insurance 
amount is based on “the maximum probable loss from claims by (a) a third party for death, 
bodily injury, or property damage or loss resulting from an activity carried out under the 
license; and (b) the United States Government against a person for damage or loss to 
Government property resulting from an activity carried out under the license” [92]. 
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Although the statutory cap is currently set at $500 million, the federal government, in the 
event of a loss greater than the initially required insurance amount, can compensate 
licensees up to an additional $3.1 billion [62]. 
5. Orbital Debris Mitigation Plan Requirement 
As a result of the USGODMSP requiring all “federal agencies that acquire or 
operate spacecraft” to apply the document’s principles to their processes [62], the AST, 
FCC, and CRSRA require commercial satellite operators to submit an orbital debris 
mitigation plan as part of their respective licensing processes [3]. For the AST, Chapter III 
of 14 CFR requires satellite operators, as part of their license application, to provide an 
orbital debris mitigation plan that meets (1) specified criteria for the probability of collision 
for satellite launch and reentry operations and (2) “safety at end of launch” standards [93]. 
For the FCC, Chapter I of 47 CFR requires satellite operators, as part of their license 
application, to provide an extensive list of statements and demonstration describing their 
orbital debris mitigation plan [94]. Lastly for NOAA, Chapter XI, Part 960 of 15 CFR 
requires satellite operators, as part of their license application, to provide “plans and 
procedures for end-of-life disposal” [62]. 
E. AREAS OF CONCERN 
The U.S. pre-launch management of commercial satellites ensures the proper 
preparation and safety of satellites for launch and operations once on orbit. Although 
current pre-launch management processes review and evaluate commercial satellite 
compliance to launch, communications, remote sensing, and orbital debris mitigation 
requirements, these prerequisites for satellite operations may not be sufficient to 
appropriately confront commercial satellite mega-constellations. As these constellations 
are expected to usher in large numbers of new satellites in LEO [7], current pre-launch 
management requirements may need to incorporate minimum thresholds for satellite size, 
maneuverability, and trackability as the absence of these elements can significantly strain 
on-orbit management activities and efforts. 
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1. Absence of Minimum Satellite Size 
Currently, no pre-launch management requirements outline a minimum size for 
commercial satellites. While there has not been a legitimate reason to manage this aspect 
of satellites, the rising trend in commercial utilization of smaller satellites and larger 
constellations now calls for some consideration in a minimum size for satellites. 
Traditionally, satellites have been large and heavy due to the technological constraints of 
their time. For instance, the Hubble Space Telescope, which launched in April 1990 and 
remains operational, has a mass of 10,886 kg and is the size of a large school bus [95]. 
Today, however, small satellites, nicknamed SmallSats [96], are increasingly “displacing 
school bus-sized satellites” for a variety of space-based services like “communications, 
broadband internet, remote sensing, and Earth observation missions” [27]. Although 
SmallSats can be described as a “spacecraft with a mass less than 180 kilograms and about 
the size of a large kitchen fridge” [96], several categories exist within this description. For 
instance, there are minisatellites (100 to 180 kg), microsatellites (10 to 100 kg), 
nanosatellites (1 to 10 kg), picosatellites (0.01 to 1 kg), and femtosatellites (0.001 to 0.01 
kg) [96]. Although the nanosatellite category is one of the most popular small satellite 
categories mainly because of the CubeSat standard design [97], the femtosatellite category 
is quickly making its debut. Femtosatellites (e.g., chipsats) are cracker-sized satellites that 
have already deployed to LEO and demonstrated the feasibility and viability of extremely 
small and inexpensive satellites [98]. 
However, as satellites become increasingly smaller in size, they inherently become 
more difficult to detect and thus more difficult to track [57]. This is a significant concern 
as commercial space entities aim to deploy larger constellations [11]. To illustrate, Cornell 
University, in November 2018, launched a shoebox-sized satellite into LEO which later 
deployed 105 chipsats in March 2019 [98]. Although the chipsats, a Cornell University 
project known as KickSat, burned up in the atmosphere on their return to Earth a few days 
after deployment, they highlighted a significant issue. The chipsats were mere circuit 
boards that measured 3.6 cm across [98]. Furthermore, very few space entities are currently 
able to comprehensively detect and track space objects smaller than 10 cm in LEO. For 
instance, the DOD, via its Space Surveillance Network (SSN), is primarily capable of 
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tracking objects that are “larger than about 10 centimeters in diameter” [62]. Although the 
DOD recently declared its new S-band tracking radar (i.e., Space Fence) operational in 
March 2020 [99], capable of detecting marble-sized objects [100] down to 2–5 cm [101], 
Space Fence remains as the only radar within the SSN to possess this capability. Similarly, 
LeoLabs, a premier U.S. commercial space situational awareness company, is primarily 
capable of tracking objects that are “10 centimeters across and larger” [102]. Although 
LeoLabs also recently declared two new S-band tracking radars (i.e. Costa Rica Space 
Radars) operational in April 2021, capable of “detect [ing] objects as small as 2 
centimeters” [103], it remains as one of very few commercial entities to possess this 
capability. 
In 2018, the FCC denied an application from Swarm Technologies, a Silicon Valley 
start-up that makes and operates SmallSats to provide internet access, to launch four 
CubeSats into LEO on the grounds that the satellites were “too small to be tracked” [27]. 
While this event can seem to be an example of a “working” mechanism that prohibits 
extremely small objects from launching into space, the process is inefficient and ultimately 
damaging to the growth of commercial space. As in the case of Swarm Technologies, 
resources can undoubtedly waste due to the current pre-launch management process that is 
not based on an established requirement for minimum satellite size. Furthermore, the 
process could strain as more new commercial satellite operators apply for the operation of 
smaller satellites and larger constellations [11]. According to the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS), regulators and policymakers are already “struggling to keep pace with small 
satellites” [27]. As such, the absence of a minimum size for satellites is not only a concern 
for pre-launch management activities, but also for on-orbit management activities. 
2. Absence of Minimum Satellite Maneuverability 
Pre-launch management requirements do not outline a minimum capability for 
propulsive maneuvering in commercial satellites. While the matter has been a topic of 
discussion due to international and national orbital debris considerations, many satellites 
already deployed or deploying to LEO today do not possess onboard propulsive capability 
[57]. As discussed, the rising trend in the commercial utilization of satellite mega-
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constellations is expected to result in “[o]rder-of-magnitude or more increases in satellites” 
[104]. The increase in the number of satellites inevitably leads to a “higher spatial density 
and a correspondingly higher collision rate” [39] which threatens the operations of all 
satellites. Therefore, the current absence of a minimum satellite propulsive capability can 
significantly complicate on-orbit management efforts, specifically space traffic 
management, to avoid collisions. Fundamentally, space traffic management can only work 
if “at least one of the two objects [in a potential collision] is maneuverable” [105]. Within 
this context, at least “86% of the collisions among cataloged objects cannot be avoided 
today” [105]. Furthermore, one study reveals that “the rate of collision between an active 
satellite and debris is substantially higher than the collision rate between two active 
satellites” in many altitude regimes of LEO [67]. As such, it is imperative to ensure that all 
future satellites are capable of maneuvering via onboard propulsive capabilities.  
3. Absence of Minimum Satellite Trackability 
No pre-launch management requirements outline a minimum capability for 
satellites to possess either active or passive means of cooperative identification and 
tracking which can aid terrestrial or space-based space awareness. Passive means can 
include components such as radar and laser reflectors (e.g., corner reflectors or retro-
reflectors) whereas active means can include components such as light emitting diodes 
(LEDs) and GPS or RF transponders [2], [10], [106]. In either case, both passive and active 
means of cooperative identification and tracking enable improved tracking of satellites. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the DOD’s capability of monitoring and tracking 
space objects is rooted in a “legacy architecture that originated in missile warning and in 
an era where there were few objects in space” [57]. As a result, the DOD’s space awareness 
architecture (i.e., sensor systems) remains inadequate at providing sufficient information 
required to support safe space operations [57]. While improvements to the SSN may take 
years, what can be done now, and likely at cheaper costs, is to perhaps implement a 
minimum capability for satellite trackability. With the continued absence of a minimum 
satellite trackability, a large influx of potentially uncooperative satellites via commercial 
satellite mega-constellations “will increasingly strain [the] DOD’s ability to provide 
actionable [space awareness] services” [57].  
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F. CONCLUSION 
The most significant takeaway from the pre-launch management of commercial 
satellite mega-constellations within the United States is the absence of minimum thresholds 
for satellite size, maneuverability, and trackability. While the era of “old space” may not 
have required such thresholds, concerns stemming from the growing commercial 
utilization of satellite mega-constellations in today’s “new space” suggest the need for U.S. 
pre-launch management processes to go beyond just satellite launch, communication, and 
remote sensing. Although thresholds pertaining to satellite design can potentially hinder 
innovation, their absence may lead to worsened conditions that threaten the safety and 
long-term sustainability of LEO. The question now is not if the United States needs more 
stringent requirements for the pre-launch management of commercial satellite mega-
constellations, but rather how the United States can implement more stringent requirements 
without hindering growth of the commercial space industry.  
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III. ON-ORBIT MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The on-orbit management of commercial satellites enables satellites to safely and 
efficiently conduct operations once launched. Primary on-orbit management activities are 
space situational awareness (SSA) and space traffic management (STM). At the 
international level, numerous entities and documents provide guidance for on-orbit 
management activities. However, the list, like in the case of pre-launch management, 
narrows when only considering those that mandate compliance from U.S. commercial 
satellites. COPUOS and the ITU-R are the only international entities that mandate 
compliance while the OST and RR are the only two international documents that mandate 
compliance. Furthermore, these management mechanisms only focus on ensuring peaceful 
space activities or interference-free communications. As a result, there is a significant lack 
of formalized verbiage at the international level for the on-orbit management of day-to-day 
commercial satellite operations [104]. Furthermore, few formal international rules and 
intents practically transfer to the national level within the United States for implementation 
on U.S. commercial satellites. Perhaps as an effect, there is currently no formalized 
national-entity solely dedicated to SSA and STM within the United States [57]. Instead, 
on-orbit management is primarily a shared effort among all U.S. space entities, both 
governmental and non-governmental. Therefore, current U.S. on-orbit management 
processes are oriented to ad-hoc problem solve and facilitate casual means of 
communication (e.g., phone calls and emails [107]). Although there is an absence of a 
formal on-orbit management regime at the national level, two entities provide a degree of 
“national” on-orbit management services—the 18th Space Control Squadron (18 SPCS) 
and the FCC. This chapter identifies and describes key entities, pertinent documents, 
current processes, and significant areas of concern within the U.S. on-orbit management 
framework. 
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B. SIGNIFICANT ENTITIES 
Several significant entities involved in the pre-launch management segment 
(discussed in Section B of Chapter II) remain involved in the on-orbit management of 
commercial satellites. At the international level, several entities are involved in the on-orbit 
management of U.S. commercial satellite mega-constellations to varying degrees. Among 
these entities, only COPUOS and the ITU-R possess the authority to prescribe national-
level requirements and are thereby able to mandate compliance from U.S. commercial 
satellites. Although COPUOS and the ITU-R primarily operate through binding 
requirements, three international entities contribute to the on-orbit management of U.S. 
commercial satellite mega-constellations via non-binding guidelines and best practices—
the IADC, SSC, and Space Data Association (SDA). While the IADC and SSC both 
passively provide on-orbit management through voluntary guidelines, the SDA actively 
provides on-orbit management through conjunction assessments and warning services [2]. 
At the national level within the United States, the 18 SPCS and FCC conduct a degree of 
“national” on-orbit management of commercial satellites and mega-constellations although 
there is no formal regime at the national level.  
1. International Entities 
• Although COPUOS does not actively manage satellite activities, the 
discussions and resulting resolutions of COPUOS have established a broad 
international framework that outlines appropriate behaviors and activities 
in space. Regarding the on-orbit management of U.S. commercial 
satellites, COPUOS prescribes mandatory requirements (i.e., OST) and 
provides advisable guidelines (i.e., LTS Guidelines and the Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines of COPUOS) that promote safe behaviors in space. 
Additionally, COPUOS addresses any legal issues that might arise from 
on-orbit space activities [46]. 
• The ITU-R ensures the “rational, equitable, efficient and economical use 
of the radio-frequency spectrum by all radiocommunication services” 
including those that utilize satellite orbits [51]. As such, and relevant to 
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the on-orbit management of U.S. commercial satellite mega-constellations, 
the ITU-R leverages its International Monitoring System (IMS), composed 
of “monitoring stations and centralizing offices voluntarily designated by 
administrations” [108], to conduct “monitoring & enforcement” activities 
[109]. These activities include “verifying the use of the spectrum in 
conformity with licenses conditions” [109] and assisting with the 
resolution of RF interference (RFI), among others [110]. 
• The IADC facilitates information exchange and fosters international 
cooperation in orbital debris research, space activities, and the 
development of debris mitigation responses and techniques [2], [56]. 
Serving as a “multi-lateral [forum] to coordinate efforts on space 
activities” [57], the IADC maintains and offers a voluntary collection of 
advisable measures for on-orbit satellite activity that enhances safety and 
mitigates orbits debris (i.e., the IADC Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines). 
• The SSC adopts and improves on “international standards, guidelines, and 
practices” relevant to space safety [58] to “promote safe and sustainable 
space operations” [2]. Although a recently established space industry 
organization, the SSC actively maintains and offers a voluntary collection 
of advisable best practices for on-orbit satellite activity that enhances 
space safety (i.e., the Best Practices for the Sustainability of Space 
Operations). 
• The Space Data Association (SDA), established in 2009, is an 
“international organization that brings together satellite operators to 
support the controlled, reliable and efficient sharing of data critical to the 
safety and integrity of the space environment” [111]. The SDA aims to 
improve on-orbit safety as well as the sharing, accuracy, and timeliness of 
flight data and collision warnings [111]. While the SDA does not prescribe 
national requirements like COPUOS or the ITU-R nor offers a voluntary 
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collection of rules like the IADC or SSC, the space “industry consortium” 
[2] provides its members a number of SSA and STM services [3] like 
“shar [ing] information on orbital positions and notif [ying] commercial 
and government members of collision risk” [2]. Members of the SDA 
include both civil and commercial satellite operators as well as “the 
world’s major satellite communications companies” [111].  
2. National Entities 
• The 18 SPCS is a unit within the recently established Delta 2 (DEL 2) of 
the U.S. Space Force (USSF) under the Department of Defense (DOD) 
[112]. The 18 SPCS is a continuously functioning entity, operating 24 
hours a day and 7 days a week, that tasks and utilizes the DOD’s SSN to 
generate spaceflight safety data [112] and to conduct “advanced analysis, 
sensor optimization, conjunction assessment, human spaceflight support, 
reentry/break-up assessment, and launch analysis” [113]. While the 18 
SPCS is primarily responsible for Space Domain Awareness [112], which 
is distinct from SSA in that it focuses on national security and thus 
incorporates intent [114], it provides SSA data and services to both DOD 
and non-DOD space entities including commercial satellite operators 
[112]. 
• The FCC is overall responsible for managing and administering portions 
of the RF spectrum for non-federal use [115]. As such, the FCC 
“coordinate [s] and synchronize [s] frequency spectrum traffic to prevent 
or mitigate interference” [2], “investigates and resolves interference” 
[116], and handles “domestic non-compliance of spectrum use” [2] by 
investigating potential violations [116], [117]. 
C. PERTINENT DOCUMENTS 
Similar to the case of significant entities, several pertinent documents relevant to 
the pre-launch management segment (discussed in Section C of Chapter II) remain relevant 
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in the on-orbit management of commercial satellites. At the international level, numerous 
documents are involved in the on-orbit management of U.S. commercial satellite mega-
constellations. Among these documents, only the OST and RR prescribe national-level 
requirements and mandate compliance if applicable to U.S. commercial satellites. 
Although the OST and RR are binding documents, there are several international, non-
binding documents that contribute to the on-orbit management of U.S. commercial satellite 
mega-constellations—the LTS Guidelines, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of 
COPUOS, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, and Best Practices for the 
Sustainability of Space Operations. In the United States, however, current national-level 
documents significantly lack verbiage for the on-orbit management of commercial satellite 
mega-constellations.  
1. International Treaties, Agreements, and Principles 
• The OST outlines broad principles for appropriate behaviors and activities 
in space to promote international cooperation on peaceful space activities. 
Regarding the on-orbit management of commercial satellites, the OST 
establishes basic principles of liability (i.e., Article VII), ownership (i.e., 
Article VIII), safety (i.e., Article IX), and information sharing (i.e., Article 
XI). While these Articles do not specifically describe activities for on-
orbit management, they collectively establish a “basic framework on 
international space law” [118] through which inappropriate space 
behaviors are more identifiable than appropriate ones. 
• The LTS Guidelines “promote and ensure the long-term sustainability of 
space activities” [72] through a collection of advisable practices in all 
three segments of satellite management. Specifically relevant to the on-
orbit management of commercial satellites is Guideline B in which 
COPUOS provides guidelines for the “safety of space operations” such as 
establishing effective means of coordination to “facilitate effective 
responses to orbital collisions,” utilizing “common, internationally 
recognized standards to enable collaboration and information exchange,” 
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and performing conjunction assessments “for all spacecraft capable of 
adjusting trajectories during orbital phases of controlled flight,” among 
others [71]. 
• The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of COPUOS provides broad 
guidelines that mitigate orbital debris in the “mission planning, design, 
manufacture and operational (launch, mission, and disposal) phases” of 
satellites [76]. Pertinent to the on-orbit management of commercial 
satellites, the document advises satellite operators to minimize debris 
released during normal operations (Guideline 1) and conduct on-orbit 
satellite maneuvers to avoid collisions (Guideline 3) [76]. 
• The IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines describes “existing 
practices that have been identified and evaluated for limiting the 
generation of space debris in the environment” [33] and offers a voluntary 
collection of mitigation measures that limit orbital debris. For the on-orbit 
management of commercial satellites, the document provides measures for 
limiting debris released during normal operations (i.e., Mitigation Measure 
5.1), minimizing the potential of on-orbit mission breakups (i.e., 
Mitigation Measure 5.2), and preventing on-orbit collisions (Mitigation 
Measure 5.4) [33]. 
• The Best Practices for the Sustainability of Space Operations addresses 
“gaps in current space governance and [promotes] better spacecraft design 
operations and disposal practices aligned with long term space operations 
sustainability” [58]. Regarding the on-orbit management of commercial 
satellites, the document provides advisable information that is more 
specific for on-orbit satellite operations, unlike debris mitigation 
guidelines, and therefore provides detailed best practices for information 
exchange and safe space operations [77].  
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2. National Laws, Regulations, and Directives 
• Space Policy Directive – 3, National Space Traffic Management Policy 
(SPD-3), issued in June 2018, calls for “a new approach to space traffic 
management” in recognition of the growing global challenges to 
spaceflight safety [119]. Among the numerous space-related items 
addressed, the directive emphasizes the need for improved SSA and STM 
capabilities [119]. In addition, SPD-3 also designates the DOC as the civil 
agency responsible for providing “the publicly releasable portion” of the 
DOD’s space object catalog and STM services not related to national 
defense [119]. 
D. KEY PROCESSES 
After U.S. commercial satellites launch and integrate with their mega-
constellations in LEO, SSA and STM activities enable the safe and efficient operations of 
satellites. However, as a result of the United States lacking a formal on-orbit management 
regime, SSA and STM is a shared effort among all those involved in the space domain. 
Although the 18 SPCS provides a degree of “national” on-orbit management services 
through activities like tracking satellites and alerting satellite operators of potential hazards 
[2], it is by no means the be-all and end-all of on-orbit management. 
1. Space Situational Awareness 
As defined by SPD-3, SSA is the “knowledge and characterization of space objects 
and their operational environment to support safe, stable, and sustainable space activities” 
[119]. SSA, along with its associated activities and data, is a fundamental component of 
on-orbit management as it provides the foundation for STM activities [3] and supports 
“decision-making processes with quantifiable and timely body of evidence (predictive/
imminent/forensic) of behavior(s) attributable to specific space domain threats and 
hazards” [2]. Within SSA, there are three major areas of activity: (1) surveillance and 
tracking, (2) conjunction assessment and catalog maintenance, and (3) environmental data 
[2]. Each area provides an essential service of characterizing an element of the space 
operating environment. Although there is no active national SSA regime in the United 
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States, the DOD’S 18 SPCS currently provides “national-level” SSA services like tracking 
satellites and alerting satellite operators of potential hazards. 
a. Surveillance and Tracking 
Within the Surveillance and Tracking component of SSA, the core effort is 
maintaining positional information of space objects which requires the collection of data 
from sensors [2]. While there are several different types of sensors available (e.g., optical, 
radar, radio frequency, laser [2]), the primary sensor types for observing Earth-orbiting 
objects are optical and radar [120]. In any case, these instruments observe space objects, 
collect observations, and provide the information to an entity for processing [2]. The 
provided observations, or tracking SSA data, fall into one of two categories: metric data or 
characterization data [3]. Metric data are “observations of space objects that are combined 
to determine orbital trajectories” while characterization data are “measures of size, shape, 
broadcast frequencies, brightness, and other data that provide information about a space 
object’s composition and capabilities” [3]. Upon collection of a space object’s “position, 
characteristics, and trajectory,” the SSA tracking data is then provided to space entities for 
processing and analysis [120].  
In the United States, the DOD is the primary provider of “national” SSA, one that 
encompasses all U.S. satellites, and does so through its SSN [62]—the largest and most 
comprehensive sensor network in the world [3], [121]. The DOD’s SSN is an extensive 
network of more than 30 ground- and space-based radars as well as telescopes [3] that 
synchronously work together to “search, discover, track, and characterize (SDTC) space 
objects” [2]. While the SSN primarily utilizes phased array radars and optical telescopes 
for its ground-based collection, it also employs “a few mechanical tracking radars” [121] 
as well as the recently established Space Fence radar which became operational in March 
2020 [122]. Figure 5 depicts the locations and names of the various sensors belonging to 
the SSN. Once the SSN collects tracking SSA data, the information flows to Vandenberg 
Air Force Base in California where the 18 SPCS begins the next step of processing, 




However, the SSN was designed to perform national security missions like missile 
warning and the defense of DOD satellites [2]. Additionally, the SSN came about “an era 
where there were relatively few objects in space, typically operating in predictable orbits 
and engaging in predictable activities” [2]. Within this context, the current national-SSA 
service provided by the DOD’s surveillance and tracking activities is insufficient. Although 
the SSN persists in performing “national-level” surveillance and tracking activities, 
numerous other entities contribute to this effort. For example, there are civil space entities, 
commercial SSA companies, academic and research institutions [2], and commercial 
satellite operators [57] that provide SSA data or services. Among these entities, the largest 
contributors are commercial SSA companies and satellite operators themselves [57]. 
Prominent commercial SSA companies include ExoAnalytic Solutions, Rincon Research 
Corporation, SRI International [57], and LeoLabs. 
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b. Conjunction Assessment Screenings and Catalog Maintenance 
Among the many SSA products and services produced in result of surveillance and 
tracking activities, the two most significant items are conjunction assessments and catalog 
maintenance. Within this component of SSA, the core effort is consistently maintaining an 
accurate catalog of resident space objects (RSOs) to “provide a variety of services and 
functions” [3] among which are conjunction assessments. As defined by NASA’s 
Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) program, a conjunction, also known as a 
close approach, is “a local minimum in the difference between the position components of 
two trajectories - the closest point of approach” [123]. Figure 6 depicts a visual description 
of a conjunction/close approach. Furthermore, NASA’s CARA program defines a 
conjunction assessment (CA) as “the process of predicting the conjunction event by 
screening the ephemeris of the protected asset against the space object catalog” [123]. 
There are several key steps to this process.  
 
 
The first step within the CA development process is orbit determination (OD) 
which is the process of computing orbital parameters to include covariance realism and 
ephemeris generation [2]. OD is “performed automatically multiple times per day to 
determine the position and velocity of each object” [124]. Second, results of OD are used 
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to update the High Accuracy Catalog (HAC) [124] which provides a foundation for further 
analyses by the 18 SPCS [57]. Currently, the 18 SPCS maintains two catalogs: the HAC 
and the two-line element (TLE) catalog [57]. The HAC is a non-public catalog, perhaps 
due to proprietary content relating to covariance, and is “a compilation of special 
perturbation element sets that are stored in state vector format with associated covariance” 
[57]. The TLE catalog is a public catalog and “consists of extrapolated general perturbation 
(eGP) element sets that are stored in TLE set format without covariance, generated from 
the HAC” [57]. While the TLE catalog does not include covariance and, as a result, “may 
not be optimal for advanced analysis and risk assessment,” the catalog does provide 
adequate accuracy for “satellite operators and the space community to maintain knowledge 
of the general location of an object” [57]. Information within the TLE catalog is available 
to the general public via the website—Space-Track.org [57].  
Third, the 18 SPCS then utilizes “the HAC to screen the orbital trajectories of all 
RSOs against all other RSOs, to include active satellites and non-active objects (debris, 
rocket bodies, dead payloads, etc.)” [124]. Currently, the 18 SPCS conducts three types of 
screenings: (1) HAC vs. HAC, (2) Owner/Operator (O/O) Ephemeris vs. HAC, and (3) O/
O Ephemeris vs. O/O Ephemeris [124]. In short, each type of screening involves a different 
pair of data that are screened against each other to identify a conjunction. For instance, an 
“O/O Ephemeris vs. HAC” involves screening “ephemeris provided by the satellite owner/
operator” against “the SP catalog data for all RSOs” [124]. It is noteworthy to mention, 
however, that a CA does not definitively provide a “yes” or “no” conclusion on whether a 
collision will occur between two objects in orbit [3]. Furthermore, due to the “numerous 
uncertainties present in each input,” a CA currently, at best, only provides a probability of 
collision [3]. 
Lastly, the 18 SPCS notifies relevant satellite operators of conjunctions if the events 
meet certain basic reporting criteria [124]. Pertinent to commercial satellite mega-
constellations, satellite operators will receive a conjunction data message (CDM) from the 
18 SPCS if they are involved in a conjunction where the time of closest approach (TCA) 
is less than or equal to 3 days and the overall miss distance is less than or equal to 1 km 
[124]. However, satellite operators will receive a CDM and a close approach notification 
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(CAN) email if they are involved in a “Emergency Criteria” conjunction where the TCA is 
less than or equal to 3 days, the overall miss distance is less than or equal to 1 km, and the 
probability of collision (Pc) is greater than or equal to 1x10^-4 [124]. In the event where 
satellite operators are involved in a “Emergency Phone Call Criteria” conjunction where 
the TCA is less than or equal to 3 days, overall miss distance is less than or equal to 1 km, 
and the Pc is greater than or equal to 1x10^-2, the 18 SPCS will provide a CDM, CAN 
email, and a phone call only if the involved objects are RSOs in the HAC [124]; O/O 
Ephemeris vs. O/O Ephemeris screenings do not apply to “Emergency Phone Call Criteria” 
[124]. Table 2 provides the basic reporting criteria for the 18 SPCS. 
Table 2. 18 SPCS Basic Reporting Criteria for Conjunctions. Source: [124]. 
 
c. Environmental Data 
Within the Environmental Data component of SSA, the core effort is evaluating the 
space operating environment’s natural dynamics: space weather, micrometeoroids, 
asteroids, Earth’s timing and orientation parameters, solar flares, and coronal mass 
ejections (CMEs) [2], [125]. Proper evaluation of environmental data, such as solar 
dynamics [125], can provide insight into the potential negative effects of the natural space 
environment on U.S. commercial satellites and their operations. At the national level in the 
United States, NOAA and NASA work together in evaluating the natural space 
environment [2]. NOAA is currently “the nation’s primary source of space-based 
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meteorological and climate data” [2] and is a key source of environmental data. NASA not 
only provides environmental data, but also evaluates and models the information [2]. In 
addition, commercial and academic entities contribute to the sourcing and evaluation of 
environmental data [2]. Environmental data is collected and used to better understand the 
current space operating environment and to support STM activities in appropriately 
managing space assets.  
2. Space Traffic Management 
As defined by SPD-3, STM is the “planning, coordination, and on-orbit 
synchronization of activities to enhance the safety, stability, and sustainability of 
operations in the space environment” [119]. STM, along with its associated activities and 
services, is a fundamental component of on-orbit management as it enables “safety driven 
maneuvers, meant to protect our most important space assets” [105]. STM activities, 
supported by SSA activities and associated data [42], ultimately aim to prevent and 
mitigate on-orbit conjunctions or collisions between two space objects [2]. Similar to SSA, 
STM is a shared effort among all those involved in the space domain. While the DOD 
conducts a fraction of STM by providing on-orbit safety information and services [126], it 
does not operate in any regulatory or authoritative capacity for non-DOD space objects like 
commercial satellites. Thus, the DOD can only notify satellite operators of potentially 
hazardous events [2]. Furthermore, it is the choice of satellite operators to maneuver or not 
maneuver their satellites [2]. Within STM, there are four major components: (1) space 
traffic coordination and safety, (2) collision avoidance risk assessment, (3) collision 
mitigation, and (4) frequency deconfliction [2]. 
a. Space Traffic Coordination and Safety 
Within the Space Traffic Coordination and Safety component of STM, activities 
primarily involve creating conditions that enable “effective data exchange and ongoing 
interaction between space operating stakeholders” and coordinating space activities among 
different space entities [2]. Currently, the DOD is the only federal entity that facilitates and 
promotes on-orbit “operator synchronization and coordination” [2] in regard to the 
management of commercial satellites. Even so, because the DOD does not possess any 
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regulatory authority over commercial satellite activities [62], the level of coordination is 
ultimately at the discretion of satellite operators.  
b. Collision Avoidance Risk Assessment 
Within the Collision Avoidance Risk Assessment component of STM, activities 
include “collision likelihood assessments, collision consequences assessments, and data 
actionability” [2]. Again, the DOD is the only federal entity to perform on-orbit “collision 
risk assessment and management” [2] in regard to the management of commercial 
satellites. On behalf of the DOD, the 18 SPCS executes “on-orbit conjunction assessment 
and collision avoidance” among several other spaceflight safety items [57]. While NASA 
also conducts collision avoidance and risk assessments, the assessments pertain 
specifically to human spaceflight activities such as ISS operations [2]. 
c. Collision Mitigation 
In the Collision Mitigation component of STM, involved activities entail 
synchronization and maneuver planning operations to avoid conjunctions or collisions [2]. 
While the DOD, via the 18 SPCS, provides some level of national oversight for collision 
mitigation by tracking satellites and notifying space entities of concerning events [2], 
collision mitigation is ultimately a communal endeavor. Because there is “no actively 
managed space traffic management system in the United States” [57], the majority of, if 
not all, satellite operators utilize their own methods and processes to evaluate and perform 
collision mitigation to protect their assets [57]. Again, because of the significant lack of 
any formalized architecture for national-level STM, satellite operators currently resolve 
collision events by communicating primarily through phone calls and emails [107].  
d. Frequency Deconfliction 
In the Frequency Deconfliction component of STM, involved activities entail the 
coordination and synchronization of the RF spectrum to mitigate or prevent RFI [2]. As 
discussed in Section B of this chapter, the FCC is responsible for managing and ensuring 
compliant RF spectrum use by U.S. commercial satellites [2]. 
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E. AREAS OF CONCERN 
Today, a formal national-level entity that manages on-orbit commercial satellites is 
largely absent. Although the 18 SPCS provides a degree of “national-level” SSA services, 
the 18 SPCS is neither formally recognized as “the” provider of national SSA nor formally 
empowered to authoritatively act on SSA data. As such, the safety of active satellites and 
their operations are entirely dependent on the responsibleness and proactiveness of satellite 
operators. While this framework for management may have been adequate to oversee the 
satellites of “old space,” it is significantly challenged by the proliferated commercial 
satellite mega-constellations of “new space.” Current absences of rules for the day-to-day 
operations of satellites, common definitions for on-orbit management activities, and formal 
entities for national SSA and STM are likely to strain on-orbit management efforts  
as commercial satellite mega-constellations usher in hundreds to thousands of satellites  
in LEO. 
1. Absence of Rules for Day-to-Day Satellite Operations 
Currently, there are no national-level documents or entities that implement a “rules 
of the road” concept in space for commercial satellites, or all U.S. satellites for that matter, 
much like those exercised in today’s motorways, airways, and waterways. The absence of 
such rules primarily derives from the fact that “most of an operator’s conjunctions in LEO 
remain with inactive objects” and “conjunctions between operational satellites [are] so rare 
that simple person-to-person communication [is] a low burden” [107]. As such, satellite 
operators, in avoiding conjunctions or collisions, have so far “been best able to determine 
the mitigation action appropriate to their mission” [107]. Furthermore, satellite operators 
“have typically opposed external maneuver directions” primarily because of “varying 
mission constraints and unique maneuver capabilities” [107]. While this may currently be 
the case, the number of new satellite operators and satellites ushered in by commercial 
satellite mega-constellations may now require rules that explicitly outline appropriate 
protocols for day-to-day satellite operations. 
As a result of the trends associated with “new space,” today’s satellite operators 
can no longer operate “under a ‘big sky’ assumption” as “close approaches, proximity 
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operations, and even collisions occur with alarming, rising frequency” [67]. Furthermore, 
as one study states, there are a number of new satellite operators who have not yet 
established a foundation of “what works best for their operations” or “developed long-
standing procedures, best practices and norms of behavior” [41]. As the number of satellite 
operators and satellites increase in the LEO operating environment, the absence of a 
national set of rules and protocols for day-to-day satellite operations may lead satellite 
operators, particularly “new space” operators, to inadvertently maneuver into a potential 
conjunction or collision which is becoming increasingly more probable as the rise in orbital 
debris population may require avoidance maneuvers.  
2. Absence of Common Definitions for On-Orbit Management 
As reported by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) in an April 2018 study, 
“there is little commonality in the definitions of SSA and STM across different entities and 
stakeholders” [57]. Although the scope of the study included the international domain, the 
document clearly revealed a disparity in the definitions of SSA and STM even among U.S. 
space entities. Although SPD-3 explicitly provided definitions for both SSA and STM 
when it was issued in June 2018, the definitions of SSA and STM still varied two years 
later when NAPA reported a “widespread variation in definitions of core terms” [2] in an 
August 2020 study. Currently, numerous space entities possess their own definitions [57] 
which can hinder future developments or operations in the on-orbit management of 
commercial satellites and constellations. For instance, due to the absence of common 
definitions of SSA and STM, the terms are “often used interchangeably” [57]. As a result, 
varying “decision-making and maneuvering processes” [57] can leave satellite operators 
vulnerable to misinterpretation and false assumptions when attempting to conduct 
constructive or even time-sensitive dialogue. Furthermore, the absence of common 
definitions for SSA and STM can lead to fundamentally different methods, processes, and 
capabilities which has already taken place among commercial space entities [57]. While 
there is nothing particularly wrong with differing SSA/STM approaches, such differences 
not rooted in common definitions can be damaging to future developments or operations 
in the on-orbit management of commercial satellite mega-constellations as there is no 
agreement in the “capabilities that constitute SSA/STM functions” [2]. 
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3. Absence of a Formal and Empowered Entity for National SSA 
From searching and tracking space objects to assessing conjunctions and notifying 
satellite operators, the 18 SPCS provides a spectrum of much needed SSA-related services 
to all U.S. satellite operators [62]. While this informal structure for “national-level SSA” 
may have been adequate for the “old space” operating environment, “new space” satellite 
populations and activities suggest a need for a more robust SSA framework. For instance, 
an April 2016 report by the DOT found that “about 70% of close approaches involving 
active satellites in orbit involve commercial systems” [62]. This means that as the 
commercial utilization of satellite mega-constellations increases, the 18 SPCS’ already 
demanding task will only become more difficult. 
Recognizing both the burden on the DOD and the fact that its services to 
commercial space entities “is not necessarily an inherently military mission” [62], 
President Trump, in June 2018, signed SPD-3 which directed the DOC to take on the U.S. 
Air Force’s (USAF’s) role of providing non-defense SSA and STM services. However, the 
transition has been sluggish with no provision of “funding and authorities” for the DOC 
from Congress even in November 2020. Although Congress approved a moderate “budget 
boost” for the DOC in the following month for FY2021, the Office of Space Commerce 
(OSC) was not elevated “from NOAA into the office of the Secretary of Commerce” where 
it was hoped that the OSC “would evolve into a Bureau of Space Commerce” [127]. As 
such, the OSC currently continues to “[work] within its limited resources” [127]. 
The lack of empowerment shown to the 18 SPCS and now to the OSC, in both 
authority and budget, is alarming considering the dire need for an effective national SSA 
entity. The sheer number of new satellites expected to be present in LEO over the next 
decade [9] ultimately means increased difficulties in conducting SSA which threaten the 
United States’ ability in ensuring safe space operations. Yet, there remains an absence of a 
formal and empowered entity for national SSA.  
4. Absence of a Formal and Authoritative Entity for National STM 
The increased numbers of space entities, active satellites, orbital debris, 
conjunctions, and potential collisions require satellite operators to concentrate efforts on 
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safely maneuvering satellites and effectively communicating with one another. While this 
may be the case, the safe maneuvering of satellites and effective communication of satellite 
operators can prove difficult without an authoritative entity for national STM. Operators 
desiring to maneuver their satellites, whether it be for getting on-orbit for operations, 
conducting on-orbit activities, or de-orbiting for post-mission disposal, must now be keen 
to two significant considerations. First is increased numbers of active satellites and orbital 
debris which, even if non-maneuvering, no longer permit satellite operators to maneuver 
however and whenever they please. Maneuvers for mitigating conjunctions or avoiding 
collisions can potentially lead operators to redirect their satellites into the trajectories of 
another object. Second, the increased volume, diversity [128], and complexity of space 
activities [9] (e.g., rendezvous proximity operations (RPOs), “satellite servicing, debris 
removal, in-space manufacturing, and tourism” [128]), inevitably means that the space 
operating environment will only become more dynamic. As such, operators must be highly 
aware and vigilant of the activities and intentional maneuvers of other satellites. Adding to 
these difficulties are the addition of commercial satellite mega-constellations and the 
absence of a formal and authoritative entity that can provide direction if needed.  
While some may believe that the issues with safely maneuvering satellites can be 
corrected with improved communication among satellite operators, communication is also 
another problem. Although the nature of “simple person-to-person communication [is] a 
low burden” and should be rather efficient and direct, “not all operators have been willing 
or able to communicate within the few days prior to the time of close approach” [107]. As 
a result, satellite operators have been forced to take drastic measures as was the case in 
2019 when an Aeolus satellite maneuvered (increased its altitude) around a Starlink 
satellite to avoid a close approach that had a Pc of 1 in 1,000 [107], [129], [130]. For events 
that provide even shorter times for response, the current means of communications is not 
enough. Making matters worse, the growing commercial utilization of satellite mega-
constellations means there will inevitably be more new satellite operators that are relatively 
unfamiliar with the space operating environment, its standard communication struggles, 
and industry-implied means of communication as there are no space traffic rules. 
Furthermore, the absence of a formal and authoritative entity for national STM means that 
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both new and experienced satellite operators do not have a credible resource for advisable 
direction after failing to establish communication with appropriate operators. 
Even then, some may believe that today’s satellite operators have enough space 
data available to not require direct or immediate communication with other operators. 
However, there are also issues with space data. For many satellite operators, the 18 SPCS 
provides needed SSA data and services. However, there is currently a general consensus 
among space entities that “the currently provided situational awareness information is 
limited and insufficient” [2]. SSA data like “realistic covariance data” and “compatible 
force model settings” along with debris and satellite sizes, dimensions, masses, and 
altitudes are all currently insufficient or largely unavailable  [67]. As a result of either 
insufficient or unavailable data along with an absence of space traffic rules, satellite 
operators may be forced to conduct ineffective collision avoidance maneuvers [131] that 
ultimately leads to collisions or the enabling of collisions.  
While issues already exist with ensuring the safe maneuvers of satellites and 
effective communications of satellite operators, the addition of commercial satellite mega-
constellations in the space operating environment certainly does not improve the outlook. 
Even with the 18 SPCS’ support to commercial satellite operators in conducting on-orbit 
activities, the absence of a formal and authoritative entity for national STM leaves satellite 
operators to ultimately decide for themselves whether or not to conduct collision avoidance 
maneuvers [2]. Furthermore, there is no assurance that satellite operators will make the 
“right” call especially because of the increasing dynamic of the space operating 
environment. This is not only a potentially dangerous predicament for involved satellite 
operators, but is also a scenario which can negatively impact all satellite operators 
operating in space. Regardless of whether a more structured STM regime arises as a single 
authority or several authorities within the United States, some level of a “central space 
traffic management authority” [107] must exist to better coordinate and monitor satellite 
maneuvers, facilitate communication, and provide advisable direction if needed. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
The most significant takeaway from the on-orbit management of commercial 
satellites within the United States is the general absence of a governing presence. The 
current on-orbit architecture remains outdated and oriented for a time when there were 
significantly fewer space objects and entities. To mitigate the adverse effects of the 
increasing presence of commercial satellite mega-constellations in LEO, standing forms of 
management, whether by entities or bodies of rules, must evolve and incorporate the day-
to-day operations of commercial satellites and constellations. Domestic SSA and STM 
entities, definitions, methods, processes, and capabilities must formalize to address larger 
issues like on-orbit management framework and structure. Without such efforts and 
management, commercial satellite mega-constellations can exacerbate current or expected 
problems in LEO. 
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IV. POST-MISSION MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The post-mission management of commercial satellites ensures the appropriate 
safing and disposal of expended satellites [2]. Involved activities include reviewing and 
evaluating plans for post-mission disposal (PMD) [39] and induced risks as well as 
monitoring and confirming the results of post-mission activities [45]. These activities 
ultimately mitigate the generation of new orbital debris and sustain the long-term 
sustainability of the space operating environment. While several international entities and 
documents provide guidance for post-mission management activities, none mandate 
compliance from U.S. commercial satellites. Instead, existing international management 
mechanisms only promote desirable post-mission satellite activities. COPUOS, the IADC, 
and SSC are international entities that promote post-mission satellites activities. Regarding 
international documents that promote post-mission satellite activities, there are the Space 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines of COPUOS, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, and 
Best Practices for the Sustainability of Space Operations. In the United States, however, 
the case is slightly different. The USGODMSP requires “all federal agencies that acquire 
or operate spacecraft [to] apply [the document’s] principles directly” [62] and, as a result, 
the AST, FCC, and CRSRA all require plans for post-mission activities as part of their 
licensing processes [62]. Consequently, post-mission management at the national level 
within the United States primarily takes place in the pre-launch management segment 
where satellite operators’ plans for satellite safing and disposal are reviewed and evaluated. 
Furthermore, the active presence of national-level post-mission management during 
physical satellite post-mission activities, aside from potentially monitoring and confirming 
the results thereof, is virtually absent. 
B. SIGNIFICANT ENTITIES 
Several significant entities involved in pre-launch and on-orbit management 
segments (discussed in Section B of Chapter III and Chapter IV, respectively) are also 
involved in the post-mission management of commercial satellites. At the international 
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level, there are few entities involved in the post-mission management of U.S. commercial 
satellite mega-constellations. Although none mandate compliance from U.S. commercial 
satellites, COPUOS, the IADC, and SSC “manage” post-mission satellite activities through 
non-binding international documents that promote and promulgate desirable post-mission 
satellite activities. At the national level within the United States, the AST, Satellite 
Division, CRSRA, and 18 SPCS passively conduct the post-mission management of 
commercial satellites.  
1. International Entities 
• Although COPUOS does not necessarily conduct “hands-on” 
management of activities, the discussions and resulting resolutions of 
COPUOS have established a broad international framework that outlines 
appropriate behaviors and activities in space. Regarding the post-mission 
management of U.S. commercial satellite mega-constellations, COPUOS 
provides advisable guidelines (i.e., the LTS Guidelines and Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines of COPUOS) that promote the mitigation of orbital 
debris as well as the sustainability of space operations. 
• The IADC facilitates information exchange and fosters international 
cooperation in orbital debris research, space activities, and the 
development of debris mitigation responses and techniques [2], [56]. 
Primarily focused on the mitigation of orbital debris, the IADC maintains 
and offers a voluntary collection of advisable measures for post-mission 
satellite activity (i.e., the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines). 
• The SSC adopts and improves on “international standards, guidelines, and 
practices” relevant to space safety [58] to “promote safe and sustainable 
space operations” [2]. Primarily focused on the comprehensive safety of 
space operations, the SSC also maintains and offers a voluntary collection 
of advisable measures for post-mission satellite activity (i.e., the Best 
Practices for the Sustainability of Space Operations). 
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2. U.S. National Entities 
• The AST regulates “the U.S. commercial space transportation industry to 
ensure compliance with international obligations of the United States” 
[60]. In regard to the post-mission management of commercial satellites, 
the AST is responsible for licensing satellite reentries [2]. As such, the 
AST requires satellite operators to obtain a license for reentry activities, if 
applicable, and prescribes the license in the pre-launch management 
segment. In addition, the AST supports the reentries of planned and 
approved satellites through “reentry predictions, safety analysis, and 
ground, maritime, and aviation safety and notices as well as orbital 
collision avoidance from orbit to reentry” [2]. 
• The Satellite Division licenses the use of the RF spectrum by U.S. 
commercial satellites [62]. Although primarily involved with commercial 
satellite mega-constellations in the pre-launch management segment, the 
Satellite Division, like the AST, requires satellite operators, as part of the 
RF licensing process, to submit plans and assessments for post-mission 
activities and orbital debris mitigation [2], [57], [62], [85]. 
• The CRSRA licenses U.S. commercial-spaced based remote sensing 
systems and operations [64]. Much like the Satellite Division, although the 
CRSRA is primarily involved with commercial satellite mega-
constellations in the pre-launch management segment, it too requires 
satellite operators, those with remote sensing missions, to submit plans 
and assessments for post-mission satellite activities [57], [62], [86]. 
• The 18 SPCS tasks and utilizes the DOD’s SSN to generate spaceflight 
safety data [112] and conduct “advanced analysis, sensor optimization, 
conjunction assessment, human spaceflight support, reentry/break-up 
assessment, and launch analysis” [113]. In regard to the end-of-life 
management of commercial satellites, the 18 SPCS supports reentry 
operations through a spectrum of activities such as conducting 
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assessments, monitoring reentries, and confirming breakups or reentries 
[112]. 
C. PERTINENT DOCUMENTS 
Similar to the case of significant entities, several pertinent documents relevant to 
pre-launch and on-orbit management segments (discussed in Section C of Chapter III and 
Chapter IV) are also relevant to the post-mission management of commercial satellites. At 
the international level, there are few documents involved in the pre-launch management of 
U.S. commercial satellite mega-constellations. While none mandate compliance from U.S. 
commercial satellites, the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of COPUOS, IADC Space 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines, and Best Practices for the Sustainability of Space 
Operations provide voluntary guidelines and best practices that promote and promulgate 
desirable post-mission satellite activities. In the United States, however, there are national 
documents, although few, that support the post-mission management of commercial 
satellites. These national documents primarily mandate commercial satellite operators to 
provide plans and assessments for post-mission activities such as disposal strategies, risk 
assessments, and debris mitigation measures [57]. 
1. International Treaties, Agreements, and Principles 
• The LTS Guidelines promote and ensure the long-term sustainability of 
space activities through a “set of 21 voluntary consensus Guidelines” [72]. 
While the document offers numerous considerations for safe space 
activities for all three management segments, it specifically provides 
Guideline B.9 which outlines measures that address the “risks associated 
with the uncontrolled re-entry of space objects” in post-mission activities 
[71]. 
• The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of COPUOS provides broad 
guidelines that mitigate orbital debris in the “mission planning, design, 
manufacture and operational (launch, mission, and disposal) phases” of 
satellites [71]. Regarding the post-mission management of commercial 
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satellites, the document provides guidelines for minimizing the potential 
of post-mission breakups (Guideline 5) and limiting the post-mission 
generation of long-term orbital debris (Guideline 6) [71]. 
• The IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines describes “existing 
practices that have been identified and evaluated for limiting the 
generation of space debris in the environment” [33] and offers a voluntary 
collection of mitigation measures that limit orbital debris. Like the Space 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines of COPUOUS, the IADC Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines also contributes to the post-mission management of 
commercial satellites through the provision of measures for minimizing 
the potential of post-mission breakups (Mitigation Measure 5.2.1) and 
conducting post-mission disposals (Mitigation Measure 5.3.2) [33]. 
• The Best Practices for the Sustainability of Space Operations addresses 
“gaps in current space governance and [promotes] better spacecraft design 
operations and disposal practices aligned with long term space operations 
sustainability” [58]. Specific to the post-mission management of 
commercial satellites, the document provides industry best practices for 
post-mission satellite activities such as maintaining specified satellite 
conditions that enable successful disposal and considering certain methods 
of satellite disposal [77]. 
2. National Laws, Regulations, and Directives 
• The USGODMSP “establishes a framework for debris mitigation 
requirements” and mandates compliance from USG agencies and 
organizations while allowing those entities to “impose more specific or 
more stringent rules” [80]. In regard to the post-mission management of 
commercial satellites, the USGODMSP provides standard practices for the 
disposal of satellites “at the end of mission life to minimize impact on 
future space operations” (Objective 4) [78].  
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• 14 CFR, Chapter III is the FAA’s regulations on commercial space 
transportation activities and outlines requirements for commercial space 
companies desiring to obtain a license for launch and reentry operations. 
Regarding the post-mission management of commercial satellites, the 
document, as part of the initial licensing process, mandates several post-
mission requirements from commercial satellite operators such as a 
reentry collision avoidance analysis which further requires operators to 
satisfy reentry conditions for probability of collision and spherical 
separation [83]. 
• 47 CFR, Chapter I is the FCC’s regulations on all telecommunications 
activities and outlines requirements for commercial space companies 
desiring to obtain a license for satellite communications. Regarding the 
post-mission management of commercial satellites, the document, as part 
of its initial licensing process, mandates commercial satellite operators to 
provide “a statement detailing the post-mission disposal plans for the 
[satellite] at end of life” [85]. Furthermore, details include any fuel “that 
will be reserved for post-mission disposal maneuvers,” casualty risk 
assessments “if planned post-mission disposal involves atmospheric re-
entry of the [satellite],” and assessments of reentry breakups [85]. 
• 15 CFR, Chapter IX, Part 960 is NOAA’s regulations on commercial 
remote sensing activities and outlines requirements for commercial space 
companies desiring to obtain a license for space-based remote sensing 
activities. Regarding the post-mission management of commercial 
satellites, the document, as part of its initial licensing process, mandates 
commercial satellite operators to provide “plans and procedures” [62] of 
post-mission disposal for remote sensing satellites that are “satisfactory to 
the President” [86]. Although much more vague than the requirements 
prescribed in 14 CFR and 47 CFR, 15 CFR nonetheless incorporates post-
mission management into its licensing process. 
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• SPD-3 calls for “a new approach to space traffic management” in 
recognition of the growing global challenges to spaceflight safety [119]. 
While the document addresses several USG focuses for improving STM 
and spaceflight safety, SPD-3 specifically calls for the periodic revision 
and domestic enforcement of “debris mitigation guidelines, standards, and 
policies” to “mitigate the operational effects of orbital debris” [119]. SPD-
3 also specifically invites both satellite and constellations operators to 
conduct post-mission disposals of their satellites [119]. 
D. CURRENT PROCESSES 
As U.S. commercial satellites near the end of their mission lives in LEO, safing and 
disposal activities safely and efficiently remove expended satellites from their mega-
constellations and operational orbits to mitigate the “collision threat to future space 
operations” [132]. The core focus of post-mission activities is the mitigation of orbital 
debris generation which ultimately reduces the likelihoods of conjunctions and collisions 
and thereby enables the long-term sustainability of space operations. As such, current U.S. 
post-mission management processes include reviewing and evaluating plans for PMD [39] 
and induced risks as well as monitoring and confirming the results of post-mission 
activities [45]. Although some post-mission processes do exist at the national level, they 
remain largely passive in that they manage post-mission activities through pre-launch 
requirements like plans and assessments. Furthermore, current post-mission processes are 
generally vague and limited in what they require from commercial satellite operators for 
post-mission activities. 
1. General Satellite Safing and Disposal Activities 
Satellite safing involves passivation which is the “process of removing stored 
energy from a space structure which could credibly result in eventual generation of new 
orbital debris after End of Mission” [132]. Intended to prevent and mitigate “accidental 
explosions” [132], the process includes activities like “removing energy in the form of 
electrical, pressure, mechanical, or chemical” from onboard satellite subcomponents [132]. 
For instance, LEO satellite operators may remove “residual propellants” remaining in the 
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“attitude control system” of their satellites by conducting “propellant depletion burns” 
[132]. Collectively, these activities mitigate “the potential of self-induced fragmentation 
and limits debris generation consequences after a collision with a small Micrometeoroids 
and Orbital Debris (MMD) particle” [132]. According to NASA, the passivation of 
satellites “should occur as soon as such operation does not pose an unacceptable risk to the 
mission” [132].  
Satellite disposal involves activities that either de-orbit or reposition expended 
satellites to effectively prevent or mitigate future conjunctions or collisions. According to 
NASA, there are three methods of satellite disposal: Earth atmospheric reentry, 
maneuvering to a storage orbit, and direct retrieval [132]. 
a. Earth Atmospheric Reentry 
Earth atmospheric entry is a method of post-mission disposal that involves the 
“natural or directed reentry [of a satellite] into the atmosphere within a specified time 
frame” [132]. For a natural reentry, or natural decay, satellite operators can leave their 
satellite “in an orbit in which natural forces will lead to atmospheric reentry within 25 years 
after the completion of mission” [132]. The rate of decay for a satellite, the rate at which a 
satellite will reenter the Earth’s atmosphere, is dependent on several factors like its orbit 
allocation and ballistic coefficient [133]. For a directed reentry, satellite operators can 
maneuver their satellite into “a controlled de-orbit trajectory” upon which the satellite can 
reenter the Earth’s atmosphere [132]. In either case, satellite operators should ensure that 
they passivate their satellites before their satellites reenter the Earth’s atmosphere [132]. 
As NASA states, a natural reentry is generally “the most energy-efficient means for 
disposal of space structure in orbits below 1400 km” [132]. 
b. Maneuvering to Storage Orbit 
Maneuvering to a storage orbit is a method of post-mission disposal that involves 
the repositioning of a satellite to “one of a set of disposal regions in which the [satellite] 
will pose little threat to future space operations” [132]. With this method, satellite operators 
must maneuver their satellite “into an orbit with perigee altitude above 2000 km and ensure 
its apogee altitude will be below 19,700 km, both for a minimum of 100 years” [132]. This 
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is due to the fact that objects in disposal orbits above 2000 km, and below Medium Earth 
Orbit (MEO), have a lower “probability of collision” which NASA currently calculates to 
be 1 per 1000 years [132]. NASA has also assessed that if a collision does occur in these 
disposal orbits, it is likely that “very little debris from that collision would come low 
enough to pose a significant threat to operational satellites in LEO” [132]. Currently, 
NASA recommends this method of disposal for satellites between 1400 to 2000 km [132]. 
c. Direct Retrieval 
Direct retrieval, also known as active debris removal (ADR) [134], is a method of 
post-mission disposal that involves the retrieving of a satellite and returning it to Earth 
[132]. Although this method is difficult and not yet operational [30], [135], NASA 
recommends satellite operators to retrieve and remove their satellite from LEO “within 10 
years after completion of mission” [132]. 
2. AST/FAA Post-mission Requirements 
The AST/FAA are responsible for all commercial launches and reentries. As such, 
the AST/FAA, during its licensing process within the pre-launch management segment, 
requires commercial satellite operators to satisfy several post-mission conditions before 
granting operators a license to conduct post-mission reentry activities. Outlined in 14 CFR, 
Chapter III, Subchapter C, Part 450, there are two significant sets of requirements that 
specifically apply Earth reentries. The first set of requirements, titled “reentry risk criteria,” 
requires satellite operators to assess and calculate the probabilities of the potential risks to 
the general public, individual entities, operating aircraft, and critical assets [83]. Currently, 
the AST/FAA mandates (1) an expected number of casualties for collective risk to be less 
than 1 × 10−4, (2) a probability of casualty for individual risk to be less than 1 × 10−6, (3) 
a probability of impact with operating aircraft to be less than 1 × 10−6, and (4) a 
probability of loss of functionality to be less than 1 × 10−3 [83]. The second set of 
requirements, titled “launch and reentry collision avoidance analysis requirements,” 
requires satellite operators to assess and calculate the probability of collision between 
reentering spacecraft and any other object, including orbital debris, as well as requiring 
reentering spacecraft to “maintain a spherical separation distance” from any other object 
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[83]. Currently, the AST/FAA mandates a probability of collision to be less than 1 × 10−5 
and a spherical separation of 25 km [83]. 
3. Satellite Division/FCC Post-mission Requirements 
Although the FCC is primarily responsible for RF spectrum management for 
satellites, it requires satellite operators to provide numerous “description [s] of the design 
[s] and operational strategies that will be used to mitigate orbital debris” [85]. Among these 
requirements, specifically relevant to post-mission activities are: (1) a statement that the 
satellite operator has “assessed and limited the probability, during and after completion of 
mission operations, of accidental explosions,” (2) a demonstration that the satellite operator 
has “assessed and limited the probability of collision between [their satellite] and other 
large objects (10 cm or larger in diameter)” when de-orbiting, (3) a “demonstration that the 
probability of success of the chosen disposal method will be 0.9 or greater for any 
individual [satellite],” (4) a demonstration that the probability of success will be “0.99 or 
better” for any satellite apart of a large system, and (5) a “demonstration that the calculated 
casualty risk for an individual spacecraft using the NASA Debris Assessment Software or 
a higher fidelity assessment tool is less than 0.0001” [85].  
4. De-orbit Support 
Within the post-mission management of commercial satellites, the 18 SPCS is the 
only government entity to conduct active management of post-mission satellite activities. 
For satellite repositioning activities, the 18 SPCS can “assist [satellite operators] by 
screening maneuver ephemeris and providing results” of satellite end-of-life repositioning 
or disposal [124]. For satellite de-orbiting activities, the 18 SPCS can “provide CA 
screenings, as well as coordinate with NASA to ensure the deorbiting spacecraft safely 
descends through the International Space Station’s orbit” and, after a satellite has 
completed its final maneuvers, “confirm final reentry” [124]. However, satellite operators 
must request these services from the 18 SPCS through the submission of an Orbital Data 
Request (ODR) along with maneuver plans and ephemeris data [124]. 
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E. AREAS OF CONCERN 
The U.S. post-mission management of commercial satellites ensures the 
appropriate safing and disposal of expended satellites [2]. However, current processes not 
only lack adequate levels of enforcement and accountability, they are inadequate at 
disposing current commercial satellites and addressing the growing number of satellites 
ushered into LEO by mega-constellations. 
1. Lack of Active Post-mission Management and Enforcement 
Although the 18 SPCS provides post-mission support services, only the AST, 
Satellite Division, and CRSRA formally manage satellite post-mission activities. However, 
these three federal entities only passively manage satellite post-mission activities as they 
require commercial satellite operators to provide associated plans and assessments before 
the satellites launch. Furthermore, the three federal entities do not have any processes in 
place to actively enforce the satellite post-mission plans they approved. As a result, “only 
15–25 percent of payloads reaching end-of-life in LEO attempt to comply” with their 
initially proposed plans for post-mission activities like “de-orbit [ing] into the Earth’s 
atmosphere within 25 years” [7]. Even then, “only 5–15 percent” result in successful de-
orbits [7]. With the current lack of active post-mission management and enforcement at the 
national level, the rise in commercial satellite mega-constellations, if following the 
behaviors of the other 75–85 percent of non-complying payloads, is likely to result in a 
worsened space operating environment in which hundreds or even thousands of expended 
and abandoned satellites threaten the safety of space operations. 
2. Inadequate Post-mission Lifetime Limits 
While the “25-year rule” may have been sufficient to alleviate the orbital debris and 
active satellite balance in the past, today’s commercial satellite mega-constellations 
significantly challenge the ability of the longstanding mitigation measure to actually 
mitigate orbital debris. As several studies now suggest, the current lifetime limit of 25 years 
for satellites in natural decays is inadequate for effective PMDs. For instance, one 
substantial 2019 study investigated the “linear growth of the orbital debris population … 
observed in the results of many evolutionary models … used to simulate the effects of the 
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widespread adoption of the [IADC] debris mitigation guidelines” [39]. Within the study, 
the “Debris Analysis and Monitoring Architecture to the Geosynchronous Environment 
(DAMAGE) model was used to perform ultra-long projections of the future debris 
population ≥ 10 cm in [LEO] under highly optimistic debris mitigation conditions” [39]. 
The results revealed “that the linear growth rate observed for the first 200 years of the 
projection period was transient and the growth was exponential, even with the ongoing and 
widespread adoption of debris mitigation measures” [39]. Furthermore, the results also 
revealed “a tendency for high and sustained collision rates at altitudes below 700 km, 
predominantly due to conjunctions between spacecraft and upper stages decaying through 
this region in observance with the ‘25-year rule’” [39]. 
Although the previous study is fairly recent, the notion of the “25-year rule” being 
insufficient goes as far back as 2006 when NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office 
modeled and evaluated LEO’s orbital debris environment. In the 2006 NASA study, the 
orbital debris environment of LEO was modeled with the assumption that “no satellites 
[would] be launched after December 2005” [8]. The results of the study revealed that 
LEO’s debris environment had already reached a level where “even if no further space 
launches were conducted, the Earth satellite population would remain relatively constant 
for only the next 50 years” [8]. The study further revealed that beyond the 50-year 
timeframe, the number of orbital debris would increase noticeably over the next two 
centuries due to the high collision activity primarily occurring in the 900 to 1000 km 
altitude regime where there is a high concentration of debris already present [8]. In 
conclusion, the study states that while orbital debris mitigation measures like the “25-year 
rule” may “slow down the [orbital debris] population growth,” they are ultimately 
“insufficient to constrain the Earth satellite population” [8]. Although its “no new 
launches” scenario is in no way realistic, the 2006 study provides clear evidence that the 
current 25-year rule has been insufficient for over a decade. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The most significant takeaway from the post-mission management of commercial 
satellites within the United States is the lack of active management and enforcement of 
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post-mission activities as well as an adequate post-mission lifetime limit for decaying 
satellites. Current post-mission management processes significantly lack the appropriate 
mechanisms to enforce the post-mission plans approved in the pre-launch management 
segment. As a result, existing orbital debris concerns only continue to worsen. Adding to 
this concern is the inadequate lifetime limit for decaying satellites which remains fixed for 
linear growth in satellite population and not an exponential growth as we are currently 
seeing due to commercial satellite mega-constellations. Continuing with this lack of active 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT 
FRAMEWORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Keeping with the intents of SPD-2 and SPD-3, the USG must balance ensuring 
sustainable and safe space operations alongside enabling the commercial space industry’s 
growth when improving the management of commercial satellite mega-constellations. An 
imbalance between the two aims can either hamper the commercial space industry 
operating within a benign space environment or support a thriving commercial space 
industry operating within an extremely dangerous space environment. As the literature 
review discussed, the approach to managing commercial satellite mega-constellations, and 
all commercial satellites for that matter, should be soft governance. However, it is prudent 
to recognize that while the U.S. commercial space industry is “generally self-motivated” 
[41] in pursuing sustainable and safe space operations (good for business), hard governance 
may be occasionally necessary to ensure more direct responses for issues that require 
immediate action. Therefore, a practical balance of soft and hard governance with the aim 
of pursuing both sustainable and safe space operations as well as growth of the commercial 
space industry should be the framework from which future management improvements 
derive. To aid such efforts, the DOC’s OSC should be the primary entity of focus. This 
chapter addresses the areas of concern previously discussed and offers improvements to 
the U.S. pre-launch, on-orbit, and post-mission management of commercial satellites with 
respect to commercial satellite mega-constellations. 
B. PRE-LAUNCH MANAGEMENT 
The U.S. pre-launch management of commercial satellites focuses primarily on 
satellite launch, communications, remote sensing, and, more recently, debris mitigation. 
Although these areas have relatively ensured safe and efficient satellite operations thus far, 
the increasing numbers of commercial satellites and mega-constellations now require the 
pre-launch management framework to incorporate minimum features of satellite safety. 
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1. Implement Core Safety Minimums 
To aid on-orbit management efforts and improve the long-term sustainability and 
safety of operations in LEO, the USG should employ the OSC in implementing “core safety 
minimums,” which can initially comprise minimum thresholds for satellite size, 
trackability, and maneuverability. As an entity designed for civil/commercial SSA and 
STM, the OSC would naturally have the most current and comprehensive knowledge of 
necessary requirements consistent with developments in SSA and STM capabilities. Much 
like the safety requirements for vehicles (e.g., seatbelts, airbags, and headlights) before 
being roadworthy, core safety minimums for satellites should similarly apply before 
launch. Regarding satellite size, a minimum diameter of 10 cm can be a value for the OSC 
to begin with due to the fact that the U.S. SSN currently and largely tracks objects of at 
least 10 cm in diameter [62]. Although a minimum satellite size could better aid U.S. SSA 
systems with tracking future satellites, the constraint could negatively impact the 
commercial satellite industry as operators pursue smaller-sized designs [27]. Since the 
objective of a minimum satellite size is to better ensure that future satellites are trackable, 
an option could be to simply circumvent a minimum satellite size and only implement a 
minimum threshold for satellite trackability. 
For satellite trackability, active or passive means of cooperative identification and 
tracking can improve observation quality and observation frequency, which reduces orbit 
uncertainty [131]. Minimum thresholds for active satellite trackability can be systems such 
as LEDs and GPS or RF transponders [2], [10], [106]. Among these systems, RF 
transponders are “one of the most promising” and are already being integrated into new 
satellites, which “allow [s] very high accuracy tracking” to the extent of enabling RPO 
activities [2]. However, commercial satellite operators may not wholly support active 
systems for satellite trackability because of the financial, size, and mass costs to integrate 
active systems. As such, the OSC should begin with minimum thresholds for passive 
satellite trackability, such as corner reflectors or retro-reflectors [106], [131]. Passive 
systems of satellite trackability can accommodate radar, laser, and electro-optical tracking 
sensors [106], [131] and may be cheaper as well as lighter alternatives to active systems. 
In any case, the OSC should consider a minimum threshold of satellite trackability as part 
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of the core safety minimums since improved on-orbit tracking contributes to the reduction 
of “false alarms” for conjunction assessments and further enables the identification of 
“truly dangerous conjunctions” [131]. 
In addition to a minimum threshold for satellite trackability, the OSC should 
consider a minimum threshold for satellite maneuverability as another element of the core 
safety minimums. Ensuring the maneuverability of all future satellites can enable on-orbit 
management entities and processes to better mitigate and prevent conjunctions or 
collisions. Although commercial satellite operators may not invite the additional weight of 
an onboard propulsion system, especially those operating SmallSats in lower altitudes of 
LEO, there is now little room for error caused by non-maneuvering satellites. The current 
number of the orbital debris population, approximately 100.5 million [35] including lethal 
nontrackable (LNT) and large derelict objects [134], highlights the need for satellite 
maneuverability to enable collision avoidance and ensure satellites are not forms of debris 
themselves. Even satellites in lower LEO altitudes that intend to leverage atmospheric drag 
and therefore do not possess onboard propulsion [57] are at risk of conjunctions and 
collisions as there is potential for “high and sustained collision rates at altitudes below 700 
km” caused by the high density of decaying objects [39]. While all satellites should be 
capable of maneuvering, it may not be feasible for many smaller-sized satellites to possess 
onboard propulsive capabilities due to size or mass constraints. Therefore, satellites above 
a specific altitude should possess onboard propulsive capabilities and, if unable, should 
remain below the specified altitude. The SSC recommends that all satellites above 400 km 
should possess onboard propulsive capabilities [107] as satellites at or below 400 km could 
de-orbit within a year [136]. The OSC should begin with the SSC’s recommended altitude 
of 400 km as a threshold for requiring commercial satellites to possess maneuver 
capability. 
While the core safety minimums can initially comprise thresholds for satellite 
trackability and maneuverability, future iterations could include other dimensions of 
satellite design if necessary. With this said, however, it is critical that the OSC collaborates 
with the commercial satellite industry in the development of core safety minimums to 
implement practical requirements that support the long-term sustainability and safety of 
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satellite operations as well as the growth of the satellite industry. As these proposed pre-
launch management requirements imply, the implementation of the core safety minimums 
is hard governance. 
C. ON-ORBIT MANAGEMENT 
The U.S. on-orbit management of commercial satellites lacks a governing presence. 
To effectively facilitate management of significantly larger numbers of active satellites, 
the on-orbit management framework must evolve to incorporate clearly defined rules that 
manage day-to-day satellite operations, a common base of core on-orbit management 
definitions, and a national entity for commercial SSA and STM. 
1. Establish Rules for Day-to-Day Satellite Operations 
The establishment of a “rules of the road” concept in space, much like those 
observed and exercised in today’s motorways, airways, and waterways, is critical for 
ensuring sustainable and safe space operations. While rules for day-to-day satellite 
operations should apply to all orbital regimes, this section intentionally focuses on LEO as 
it is the regime in which most commercial satellite mega-constellations have deployed or 
will deploy. Furthermore, while such rules should address a broad variety of space 
activities and events, this section focuses on conjunction and collision avoidance between 
two maneuverable objects to provide initial groundwork for future expansion.  
The large majority of current and planned commercial satellite mega-constellations 
possess missions for remote sensing or communications [9], [11]. Due the fact that these 
missions require satellites, even those not tied to constellations, to maintain a “fixed angle 
about nadir for imaging or maintain beam lay-down patterns” [107], a set of rules for day-
to-day satellite operations that mitigates or prevents conjunctions and collisions should 
avoid interfering with mission operations (e.g., “non-zero yaws” [107]). Since many of 
today’s LEO satellites with maneuver capability can perform basic maneuvers to overcome 
the effects of drag (e.g., positive in-track delta-V), the initial set of rules for day-to-day 
satellite operations should leverage this relatively common satellite capability to take 
advantage of “semimajor axis or orbital period changes” as they offer effective means of 
lowering conjunction and collision risk by phasing time [107]. 
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For instance, satellites at an operational altitude of 780 km can create “~135 meters/
day of along-track change” with a single meter adjustment in semimajor axis [107]. 
Although a simple method, this approach is not only effective in “increasing separation 
from another object for most conjunctions,” [107] but also accommodates the majority of 
current and future LEO satellites and constellations. As for thresholds of sufficient 
mitigation or prevention, the initial set of rules for day-to-day satellite operations should 
reference an agreement established among OneWeb, Maxar, and Iridium, which suggests 
that “each satellite should maneuver by a magnitude that mitigates the conjunction to [a Pc 
of] less than [1x10^-6]” [107]. Although the safety threshold applies to conjunctions 
involving two maneuverable satellites, it can also apply to conjunctions involving a 
maneuverable satellite and a non-maneuvering object (e.g., unresponsive active satellite or 
orbital debris). However, a question that remains is how satellites involved in a conjunction 
should maneuver. This is a critical point to clarify to “avoid both objects executing 
maneuvers that nullify each other” [107]. Furthermore, there are significant variables to 
consider such as whether or not the satellites have positive, negative, or both in-track 
maneuver capabilities, which limit or enable maneuver options. As such, the initial set of 
rules for day-to-day satellite operations will require a system that designates which of the 
two satellites involved in a conjunction should maneuver and when. 
Therefore, the USG should employ the OSC to establish the first set of space traffic 
rules that leverage the most basic propulsive capability (i.e., positive in-track delta-V) and 
establish a designation system that identifies which of the two satellites involved in a 
conjunction executes a maneuver and when. Although an ideal start to space traffic rules 
would be a system that leverages both positive and negative in-track maneuvers, not all 
LEO satellites currently possess retrograde thrusters [107]. Regarding a system for 
designating the maneuvering satellite, the process can be based on a variety of satellite 
values, such as available fuel, catalog number, size, or mass, among others. Moving 
forward in this approach, the OSC should collaborate with the commercial satellite industry 
to develop and fine-tune the rules for day-to-day satellite operations. To this effort, the 
OSC should also require commercial satellite operators to share vital information such as 
tracking data, satellite ephemeris, maneuver plans, thruster capabilities, fuel estimates, and 
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contact information [107], which can aid decision processes for rules of day-to-day satellite 
operations. 
2. Establish Core Definitions and Standards 
The absence of common core definitions and standards for on-orbit management 
activities such as SSA and STM can be damaging to future developments or operations in 
the management of commercial satellite mega-constellations. Although SPD-3 defines 
SSA and STM, the document does not describe “decision-making and maneuvering 
processes” [57] nor does it define other terms relevant to on-orbit management (e.g., 
conjunction and conjunction assessment, among others). To prevent misinterpretation and 
false assumptions among satellite operators when conducting constructive or even time-
sensitive dialogue, the on-orbit management framework should call on the OSC to 
explicitly define standard thresholds and describe the basic elements that comprise core 
on-orbit management terms. To the best extent possible, standards, procedures, and 
thresholds should accompany the description of the object, event, or process to avoid 
ambiguity. For instance, a conjunction should be defined as “an unsafe local minimum 
separation distance between the positional components of two trajectories where the 
probability of collision is greater than 1x10^-6” [107], [123]. Additionally, the 
establishment of common standards and procedures (e.g., force models, propagation tools, 
and OD algorithms) can further avoid ambiguity. The OSC should also define more on-
orbit management terms, even those that may seem trivial, such as catalog, risk, and 
screening, which can all easily vary in meaning as they incorporate different levels of 
detail, accuracy, and capability. With significantly more objects expected to exist in LEO, 
there is potential for a reduction in effective mitigation or prevention timelines. As such, it 
is critical for all U.S. satellite operators to be on the same page especially when using basic 
on-orbit management terminology. 
3. Establish and Empower National Entity for SSA/STM 
The absence of dedicated national entities for commercial SSA and STM prevents 
effective management of current and future commercial satellite mega-constellations. 
Although SPD-3 directed the DOC to take on civil/commercial SSA and STM 
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responsibilities from the USAF/USSF, the OSC remains unsupported by Congressional 
acts [104]. With the increasing pace of space operations largely in part due to commercial 
satellite mega-constellations, the on-orbit management framework will require the OSC to 
possess sufficient funding, resources, and legal authorities. Therefore, Congress must 
advance the stagnant transition of civil/commercial SSA and STM responsibilities to the 
OSC and empower the OSC with funding, resources, and legal authorities. Without such 
support to the OSC, the USG will be unable to ensure “a good position to maintain safe 
space operations” [104]. 
Regarding SSA, Congress must transform the OSC into the Bureau of Space 
Commerce [127]. In addition, the OSC must receive adequate and non-fungible funding 
that supports its national SSA responsibilities and services such as the continued 
development of the Open Architecture Data Repository (OADR)—a single object catalog 
concept that “improve [s] SSA data interoperability and enable [s] greater SSA data 
sharing” [137]. The concept of a single national object catalog can reduce strain on 
maintenance and assessments since “[o]nly one SSA analysis is required against that single 
catalog, and all resources are devoted to maintaining that single catalog at the highest 
achievable accuracy” [138]. Furthermore, commercial satellite operators utilizing the 
OADR should be more in sync due to the fact that a single catalog produces only “one 
version of generated SSA results” [138]. This can be especially helpful as commercial 
satellite mega-constellations raise the dynamic of the space operating environment through 
increasing numbers of active satellites, satellite operators, and on-orbit activities.  
As such, the Congress must ensure that the OSC has sufficient funding and 
resources to “ingest and fuse/amalgamate space data contributions provided by any/all 
space trackers and satellite operators” [138] to decrease uncertainties in CA development 
and further reduce the need for unnecessary maneuvers. Moreover, this reiterates the need 
for the OSC to require satellite operators to share tracking data, satellite ephemeris, 
maneuver plans, thruster capabilities, fuel estimates, and contact information [107]. With 
this information, the OSC should provide improved modeling, tracking, and determinations 
for maneuvers which directly support commercial satellite operations at minimal expense 
for commercial satellite operators. While this is by no means an easy task, an initial starting 
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point for the OSC should be collaborating and consulting with premiere U.S. commercial 
SSA entities such as LeoLabs, ExoAnalytic Solutions, and Analytical Graphics, Inc. (AGI), 
among others. 
 Regarding STM, Congress must draft and pass legislation to empower the OSC to 
function as a central directing authority. However, this does not suggest that the OSC 
should be responsible for the constant provision of direction for satellite traffic. Instead, 
the OSC should verify if satellite maneuver decisions by commercial operators are safe, 
recommend safe satellite maneuvers for planning purposes (if requested), authoritatively 
prohibit unsafe satellite maneuvers based on established Pc thresholds, and authoritatively 
direct satellites as hazardous events require. Although satellite operators should remain 
responsible for the safe maneuvering of their own satellites, the OSC can act as a 
verification and consultation mechanism for commercial STM as it would have access to 
the OADR and commercial tracking data. Furthermore, as the provision of CDMs to 
satellite operators is a critical element of STM, the OSC must establish a system that clearly 
outlines its responsibility for providing CDMs as well as operators’ responsibility for 
verifying receipt of CDMs. This can ensure that all parties involved in a conjunction are 
aware of an imminent event and recognize the need for preventive action. Furthermore, as 
CDMs typically alert satellite operators of conjunctions “a few days to a week” in advance 
[104], the system can explicitly establish a timeline in which operators respond to CDMs 
which removes ambiguity and last-minute maneuvers due to unresponsive operators.  
D. POST-MISSION MANAGEMENT  
The U.S. post-mission management of commercial satellites lacks active 
supervision and enforcement of post-mission activities and implements an inadequate 
lifetime limit for satellites. As the surge of today’s satellite launches due to commercial 
satellite mega-constellations inevitably leads to large numbers of de-orbiting satellites, the 
USG should incentivize operators to quickly de-orbit satellites at end-of-life. 
1. Incentivize Post-mission Disposals 
The active supervision and enforcement of PMD is challenging as the post-mission 
management of commercial satellites largely exists in the pre-launch management segment 
75 
through satellite licensing requirements. Furthermore, current ambitions for active debris 
removal (ADR) remain in development and are, at the moment, “economically and 
technologically unfeasible” [139]. As the number of active satellites significantly increase 
due to commercial satellite mega-constellations, PMD compliance becomes more 
imperative. With limited options for actively supervising and enforcing PMD, the post-
mission management framework should incentivize PMD as a near-term solution for 
ensuring compliance. Mirroring the point system for drivers on today’s roadways, the USG 
should establish a similar point system for satellite operators in space. Today, most states 
utilize a point system where drivers receive demerits based on violations of established 
traffic rules [140]. Within these point systems, a higher value of demerits corresponds to a 
higher chance of a driver’s license becoming suspended. Similarly, a point system should 
apply to satellite operators where violations of established space rules (e.g., PMD) could 
result in negative impacts such as higher pre-launch application fees, more stringent pre-
launch assessments, or even suspension from launch operations (for repeating offenders). 
For obvious reasons, suspended operators would continue operating their satellite, but 
would have to remove their demerits through means like reviews and demonstrations of 
operational safety and compliance. Additionally, the AST requires satellite operators to 
possess a third-party liability insurance for launches. Similar to how vehicle insurers raise 
rates for accident-prone drivers, satellite insurers can do the same for negligent satellite 
operators.  
 Within this framework, the responsibility for active supervision and enforcement 
for PMD rests with satellite operators, as it should be. Since “accidents” in space are rather 
difficult to conceal, there is more of an incentive for satellite operators to execute their 
proposed PMD plans. Furthermore, the provision of truer incentives for responsible 
satellite operators should come through means such as reduced application fees or 
streamlined application processes. To begin implementing such a system, the USG should 
clearly establish the OSC as the entity for PMD enforcement. Moving forward, the OSC 
should collaborate and consult with well-established STM and debris mitigation entities 
such as the SSC and IADC to develop standards and thresholds from which a point system 
is based as well as the repercussions of negligent or unsafe behaviors.  
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2. Reduce Orbit Lifetime Limit of 25 Years 
As studies now clearly suggest, the orbit lifetime of 25 years for decaying satellites 
is no longer adequate for ensuring the long-term sustainability and safety of space. Already, 
several operators of large satellite constellations “have realized that placing their satellites 
on 25-year decay orbits will still cause a substantial increase in the debris over the long 
term due to the large number of [involved] satellites, their mass, and the altitude regime 
they must transit to re-enter” [131]. With more active spacecraft operating in space due to 
commercial satellite mega-constellations, the USG must reduce the post-mission orbit 
lifetime for spacecraft to remove objects quicker from the congested operating 
environment. One option comes from Dr. Darren McKnight in Space Traffic Management 
– Do Not Build on a Weak Foundation: reduce the orbit lifetime limit of future satellites to 
1 year [141]. Although the reduction is significant, it can substantially decrease the rate of 
collision in LEO, especially at lower altitudes where satellites decay, [141] and can 
appropriately facilitate the increasing pace at which satellites de-orbit. 
However, one of the major arguments that oppose this approach is that a reduction 
contributes negligibly over a 200-year period [141]. For instance, some suggest that a 
reduction of post-mission satellite orbit lifetimes from 25 years to 5 years only contributes 
a 10% decrease in the number of objects (over 200 years) and is therefore statistically 
insignificant [141]. As McKnight asserts, however, the research used for the assertion 
“aggregates cataloged debris from all of LEO and, therefore, ignores debris created below 
~800 km since debris at these altitudes washes out in decades” [141]. As a result, the 
assertion’s research does not consider both the high number of “large breakups every few 
years below ~850 km” since they do not accumulate over a 200-year period [141], and the 
fact that this significantly affects access to space. Furthermore, the assertion’s research 
utilizes a 200-year simulation, which although useful for assessing long-term 
sustainability, is inadequate for assessing safety as it disregards “commercially relevant 
altitudes” [141]. As such, the USG should reduce the post-mission satellite orbit lifetime 
limit from 25 years to 1 year to best prepare for the increasing pace of launch and de-orbit 
of satellites belonging to commercial mega-constellations. An updated USGODMSP 
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should promulgate the reduction; the AST, FCC, and CRSRA should implement it in their 
pre-launch licensing requirements for debris mitigation; and the OSC should enforce it. 
In addition, it is important to recognize that the limit of 25 years for post-mission 
orbit lifetime is based on a “typical propellant requirement” which requires 2–5% of the 
upper stage’s dry mass [141]. Due to the fact that remaining below a “5% mass fraction in 
satisfying a more stringent PMD threshold” may be too difficult for commercial satellite 
operators today (due to size, mass, and fuel constraints), commercial satellite operators 
could turn to electric propulsion [141]. As proven in a study by Aerojet Rocketdyne, 
advancements in electric thruster technology could effectively enable a significantly 
shorter post-mission orbit lifetime limit and allow satellites to remain “within the 5% mass 
fraction threshold” [141], as Figure 7 depicts. Therefore, USG should encourage the 




E. TRANSFERABLE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
As space is inherently an international domain, improved management of 
commercial satellite mega-constellations cannot be exclusive to the United States. 
However, the international community, primarily government-to-government interaction, 
has historically proven to be slow in reaching consensus on requirements for space 
activities [40]. Therefore, it may be more effective to provide spacefaring nations with an 
example of a functioning management framework that employs a practical balance of soft 
and hard governance for enabling sustainable and safe space operations. A management 
framework that purely focuses on improving the sustainability and safety of space as well 
as growth of its own commercial space industry, is likely to be enticing for many, if not 
all, spacefaring nations. If widely adopted, there is potential for universal implementation 
of space guidelines, standards, and best practices that would have otherwise been 
unrealized through traditional means of international consensus. Furthermore, wider 
adoption by spacefaring nations eventually implies isolation for those not participating. 
This was the case in 2019 when Russia, after “continued veto of the 21 guidelines” 
established by COPUOS, agreed to the guidelines in fear of isolation [142]. As such, the 
USG should frame its improvements to the management of commercial satellite mega-
constellations for straightforward adoption by other spacefaring nations regardless of 
economic or technologic standing. Improvements should not leverage or require excessive 
costs that only the United States can satisfy. Additionally, improvements should not solely 
leverage government proprietary SSA and STM capabilities. Instead, improvements should 
largely utilize commercial SSA and STM capabilities, which intrinsically offer services to 
a wider audience and can further enable adoption by other spacefaring nations. 
One of the challenges of establishing such a management framework partly stems 
from the fear of appearing too stringent which might encourage the commercial satellite 
industry to do business elsewhere. Therefore, it is even more imperative for the United 
States to take the initiative and be the first to set an example. Considering that the United 
States is one of the most active spacefaring nations [143] and also the nation that possesses 
“the world’s largest commercial satellite constellation” [4], it is best situated to establish 
and demonstrate an effective management framework that improves the sustainability and 
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safety of space as well as growth of its own commercial space industry. To help accomplish 
this task, the USG should consider establishing a national consortium initially comprised 
of well-established commercial satellite operators.  
The primary purpose of the national consortium should be continuously stimulating 
discussions pertaining to sustainability and safety concepts for satellite operations, and 
intentionally pursuing industry-wide guidelines, standards, and best practices for U.S. 
commercial satellites. Similar examples of such an entity include the Consortium for 
Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations (CONFERS), the Satellite Industry 
Association (SIA), and the SSC [41]. While the entity should one day act as a mediator 
between satellite operators and policymakers, proposing well-established consensus-based 
rules for hard governance, the initial objective of the entity should be promulgating and 
implementing widely accepted sustainability and safety concepts within the U.S. 
commercial space industry (soft governance exercised by the commercial industry itself). 
The mutual relationship between the USG and the proposed national consortium should 
better ensure that the U.S. management framework for commercial satellite mega-
constellations is appealing and transferable to other spacefaring nations. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Moving forward, the USG must find a balance in protecting the space environment 
and assets therein as well as the freedom of the commercial space industry to conduct 
operations. As illustrated throughout this thesis, the collective challenge facing these goals 
is complex and multifaceted. Therefore, it is critical that the USG avoids improving only 
one dimension of commercial satellite and satellite mega-constellation management. 
Instead, the USG should consider improvements in all segments of management and should 
heavily leverage and utilize the knowledge, opinion, and capabilities of the commercial 
space industry. In broader terms, this chapter posits four significant takeaways for 
management improvements: (1) the USG should establish a management framework for 
improving the sustainability and safety of space as well as growth of the commercial space 
industry; (2) the USG should adopt soft governance rules that derive from widely-accepted 
guidelines, standards, and best practices of the commercial space industry; (3) the USG 
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should apply hard governance rules to areas that require direct and immediate action; and 
(4) the USG must establish a management framework that straightforwardly transfers to 
other spacefaring nations. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. KEY POINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis presents the author’s recommendations for how the USG should 
improve the management of commercial satellite mega-constellations to ensure the 
sustainability and safety of LEO as well as enable growth of the commercial space industry. 
This thesis examines entities, documents, and processes involved in the U.S. pre-launch, 
on-orbit, and post-mission managements of commercial satellites to identify areas of 
concern raised by commercial satellite mega-constellations. The main challenge facing the 
management of commercial satellite mega-constellations is the lack of national-level 
oversight and standards specifically for these “new space” massive architectures. As these 
large constellations involve more satellites and draw more satellite operators, the potential 
for accidents can grow significantly if left inappropriately managed. This fact is apparent 
in all three segments of commercial satellite management. 
In the pre-launch management segment, entities and processes largely focus on 
launch, communications, remote sensing, and, more recently, orbital debris mitigation 
requirements. However, the rise of commercial satellite mega-constellations now 
necessitates pre-launch management entities and processes to incorporate minimum safety 
features for satellites that improve on-orbit safety (i.e., satellite maneuverability) and 
management activities (i.e., satellite trackability). Therefore, the USG should employ the 
OSC in implementing “core safety minimums” that include propulsive capabilities and 
passive or active means of trackability. 
In the on-orbit management segment, there is a significant lack of a governing 
presence for commercial satellites. There remains an absence of rules for the day-to-day 
operations of satellites and a governing set of core definitions and standards for on-orbit 
management activities. Furthermore, there is an absence of dedicated, empowered, and 
authoritative entities for national SSA and STM. With the conservative expectation of a 
“ten- to twenty-fold increase in the number of orbiting active spacecraft within the next ten 
years alone” [41], commercial satellite mega-constellations necessitates on-orbit 
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management protocols to address the looming interaction of satellites, operators, and risks. 
As such, the USG should employ the OSC to establish a basic body of space traffic rules 
and a set of core definitions and standards for on-orbit management activities. In addition, 
Congress must improve the formalization and empowerment of the OSC to enable it to 
effectively act as the nation’s focal point for commercial SSA and STM. 
In the post-mission management segment, there is a lack of active enforcement for 
post-mission activities and an adequate lifetime limit for decaying satellites. With the 
increasing pace at which commercial satellites launch (potentially 1,100 per year by 2025 
[2]) and de-orbit as a result of commercial satellite mega-constellations, the USG should 
consider new alternatives for enforcing PMD and preventing collisions caused by decaying 
objects. Therefore, the USG should designate the OSC as the national entity for 
incentivizing PMD, perhaps through a point system, and should reduce the post-mission 
orbit lifetime limit from 25 years to 1 year.  
In all three management segments, the USG/OSC must leverage and communicate 
with the commercial space industry, especially satellite operators, to better develop 
effective improvements to the management of commercial satellites and mega-
constellations. The commercial space industry provides a wealth of knowledge, 
experience, and insight regarding space operations which will be significantly valuable for 
evaluating the feasibility of proposed improvements. Close coordination with the 
commercial space industry can better ensure that improvements are promulgated and 
implemented efficiently and effectively.  
Lastly, improved management of commercial satellites and mega-constellations 
cannot be exclusive to the United States. Due to the fact that the international community 
remains unable to reach consensus on requirements for space activities, it may be more 
effective to provide the international community with a functioning management 
framework that pursues improving sustainable and safe space operations as well as growth 
of its commercial space industry. Such a management framework can likely be enticing for 
many, if not all, spacefaring nations to adopt. Therefore, the USG, as one of the world’s 
leading nations in space, must take the initiative and ensure that improvements to its 
management framework is transferable to other spacefaring nations. This means keeping 
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true to purely pursuing sustainable and safe space operations as well as growth of the 
commercial space industry. This also includes avoiding improvements that leverage or 
require excessive costs and technologies that only the United States can satisfy. Afterall, 
space is inherently an international domain where one accident affects all.  
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several areas for future research. One area that follows this research is 
the feasibility of other spacefaring nations adopting the improvements to commercial 
satellite management proposed in this thesis. Additional studies should examine requisite 
infrastructure, policy, and costs for implementing the proposed improvements. Regarding 
pre-launch management areas for future research, studies should explore the feasibility, 
requirements, and advantages or disadvantages of consolidating all satellite pre-launch 
management requirements in a single entity or process. If possible and implemented, the 
result could streamline the commercial satellite application process and reduce excess costs 
for both the USG and commercial satellite operators. Future on-orbit management studies 
should explore and define the technical details enabling the rules for day-to-day satellite 
operations (i.e., space “rules of the road”) especially for when orbits become more 
complicated by new electric propulsion systems and orbits no longer fit standard 
propagation models. While the advantages of such a concept are apparent, feasibility is 
again a question that requires examination. Lastly, future research should explore and 
define the PMD point system proposed in this thesis and alternative incentive systems for 
post-mission management. 
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